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INTRODUCTION:  THE ALLURING ILLUSION OF TEXT 
What do the words in an insurance policy mean? What is the legal 
effect of those words? These two simple inquiries drive insurance and 
contract law as well as the modern economy. Insurance is the financial 
backstop of society’s losses—from automobile accidents to house fires to 
injuries from defective products. Answers to insurance coverage 
questions matter because those affected are often riding a fine line 
between survival and complete financial destitution.  
Insurance coverage disputes that center on construing insurance policy 
language include such far-ranging issues as: 
a) Does a clause in a liability insurance policy that purports to exclude 
losses from a “pollutant” catch only industrial pollution such as dumping 
glowing toxic liquid into a lake? Or does it also avoid payment for damages 
from a slip and fall on spilled bleach (a chemical “pollutant?”) in a grocery 
store aisle?1  
 
b) Does the loss of both towers at the World Trade Center during the 9/11 
attacks constitute one insured “occurrence” or two?2  
 
c) Can a business’ income losses resulting from a government-mandated 
closure order during the COVID-19 pandemic be covered if the policy 
requires “direct physical loss of or damage to” the policyholder’s 
property?3 
 
 1.  Where a “pollutant” is defined in the policy as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant 
or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.” See, e.g. Kent 
Farms, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 140 Wn2d 396, 998 P2d 292 (Wash. 2000); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason 
and Pollution: Construing the “Absolute” Pollution Exclusion in Context and in Light of its Purpose and 
Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1 (1998). 
 2.  Compare SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Prop., LLC, 222 F. Supp. 2d 385, 398-99 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding as a matter of law that policy with language defining occurrence as “all losses 
or damages that are attributable directly or indirectly to one cause or to one series of similar causes” 
defined September 11 damage to World Trade Towers as one occurrence), with SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co v. 
World Trade Ctr. Props. LLC, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1103, at *15-16(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2003 (policy 
ambiguous as to meaning of occurrence when policy speaks of a “series of losses . . . arising out of one 
event”). “Eventually, a jury found two occurrences for insurance policies [without the] ‘batching’ 
language [of the Willis brokerage binder containing a broad definition of occurrence].”  JEFFREY W. 
STEMPEL, ERIK S. KNUTSEN & PETER N. SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 7 (5th ed. 2020).  The 
jury verdict was upheld by the trial court and on appeal.  See Court Upholds Juries’ Rulings on World 
Trade Center Claims, INS. J. (Oct. 19, 2006), https://perma.cc/AQ5P-X6KW.  See also Rodd Zolkos, 
‘Wilprop’ case changes the industry, INS. J. (Sept. 11, 2011), https://perma.cc/7RAK-XLFU (discussing 
creation and use of Willis Wilprop binder originally intended by policyholder to reduce need to pay 
multiple deductibles but as applied to 9/11 loss of Towers reduced available property insurance coverage 
by more than $1 billion). 
 3.  Compare Studio 417, Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Company, 2020 WL 4692385 (W.D. Mo.) 
(Aug. 12, 2020) (applying Missouri law) (possibility of coverage for COVID-19-related closure losses 
2
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Courts deciding these disputes have two possible approaches to an 
insurance policy construction question: (1) a strict, literalist approach to 
the words at issue, or (2) a more contextual, functionalist approach. The 
approach taken may fundamentally change the result.  For instance, the 
characterization of a bleach spill as either a matter of standard premises 
liability or a pollution event illustrates the impact of the different judicial 
approaches.  A rigidly textualist court would likely hold that household 
bleach could be a “pollutant” because bleach fits the broad definition of 
“pollutant” in the policy. Under this analysis, coverage would be denied.  
Contextualist courts examine the purpose of the policy and, in the 
bleach example, would consider the purpose of the pollution exclusion. 
An examination of the insurer underwriting information about that 
pollution exclusion in an all-risk liability policy would reveal insurers’ 
intention to avoid paying for large-scale industrial “smoke-stack” type 
pollution, because such pollution could cause widespread losses and be 
mitigated through safety efforts. Insurers did not mean to target slip-and-
fall injuries from household bleach spills in grocery stores. A 
contextualist court would conclude that reading the exclusion broadly to 
catch this sort of loss is inconsistent with the purpose of the exclusion: to 
exclude from coverage those losses arising from industrial-type pollution. 
Despite the departure from strict adherence to textualism signalled in 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts4 in 1981, courts continue to 
embrace a textualist approach in contract interpretation5 cases, including 
 
because use of property was restricted) with Diesel Barbershop, LLC v. State Farm Lloyds, 479 F. Supp. 
3d 353, 360-362 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2020) (granting a motion to dismiss because the coronavirus did 
not cause a direct physical loss, and “the loss needs to have been a ‘distinct, demonstrable physical 
alteration of the property.’”).  See also Erik S. Knutsen & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Infected Judgment: 
Creating Conventional Wisdom and Insurance Coverage Denial in a Pandemic, 27 CONN. INS. L.J. 185 
(2020) (reviewing COVID-19 coverage cases and criticizing courts taking unduly narrow construction of 
terms “direct physical loss or damage”). 
 4.  See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 200-229 (1981) 
(taking what observers have termed a “contextual” approach to determining the meaning of disputes 
contracts terms). See also JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 3.12 (7th ed. 2013) (discussing Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts approach as contextual and consistent with functional approach of Yale Professor 
Arthur Corbin, as contrasted with more formalist approach of Harvard Professor Herbert Williston); E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.8 (4th ed. 2004) (portraying Restatement (Second) approach as 
functional and contextual). 
 5.  For purposes of this paper, we will generally treat the terms “interpretation” and 
“construction” as synonyms although we recognized the long-standing technical view of many that 
interpretation is the process of determining what a text means while construction is the process of the 
application of the text and giving it legal effect.  See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of 
Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 (2017) (noting the distinction and citing to sources). See also 
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1951) at section 534 (“interpretation” is about 
understanding what ideas the language in a contract induces in people; “construction” is the determination 
of the legal operation of the contract). 
3
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insurance cases.6 Scholars either cheer on7 or chastise courts for any 
perceived deviation from the textualist approach.8  However, textualism 
 
 6.  See, e.g., Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135 
(Fla. 1998) (giving literal and broad application to pollution exclusion in general liability policy to 
preclude coverage for architecture firm sued when its spill of a blueprint machine released arsenic that 
emitted fumes requiring evacuation of building); E.C. Fogg, II. v. Florida Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
E.C. Fogg, 711 So. 2d 1135 (1998) (same, barring coverage due to pollution exclusion when crop duster 
sued for accidental direct spraying on farmer and sheriff’s deputy inspecting crop land); Allen v. 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992) (giving strict enforcement to household 
exclusion in homeowner’s policy barring coverage for intra-family claims and rejecting reasonable 
expectations approach in almost strident terms; also seemingly taking absolute view that because 
insurance policy forms must be approved by state insurance regulator, policy language cannot be regarded 
as unclear, unfairly surprising, unconscionable, or violative of public policy). 
  In Chestnut Associates Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 17 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (M.D. Fla. 2014), 
the federal trial court applying Florida law held that the pollution exclusion applied where a pool 
technician “sexually pleasured himself” in a client’s pool, causing alleged property damage to the pool. 
The case offers some comic relief but illustrates a jurisprudence of silly textual literalism. 
 7.   See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW (2015) (textualist manifesto); 
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005) (generally approving of 
textualism as preferred interpretative methodology).  See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries 
Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation – and the Irreducible Roles of 
Values and Judgment Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV., 685, 685 (2014) (noting that empirical research 
suggests that “judicial ideology matters more than methodology in determining interpretative outcomes” 
and rejecting “the frequent claim of textualists that their theory much more stringently restrains value-
based decision making than does purposivism”); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006); Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of 
Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25 (1994) (discussing the respective textualism of the Justices 
concerning constitutional text).  
  Although the bulk of scholarly writing regarding interpretation theory has focused on statutory 
interpretation, similar but less voluminous writings for and against textualism are found regarding contract 
law.  See, e.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 
89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991) (noting importance of context but also that contextual inquiry has less 
readily apparent boundaries than textual inquiry); E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of 
Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1967) (assessing traditional and modern approaches to interpretation, 
including plain meaning and parol evidence rules).  
 8.  See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 29-41 (2015) (advocating textualism and 
criticizing interpretation deemed insufficiently deferential to text); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Foreword 
to READING LAW, at xxi-xxvi (endorsing textualism in statutory interpretation and arguing that 
“[l]egislative intent is a fiction.”).  See also Bryan Garner, LawProse Lesson #206: Statutory and 
Contractual Interpretation, https://perma.cc/92S3-7YJU  (“all judges are textualists first (‘We begin with 
the words’ is a mantra in judicial opinions), even if they then move on to consider other matters, such as 
their own policy preferences.  They all start with the text.”).  Garner argues that the most “important skill” 
that is “generally lacking among law-school graduates” is “[a]most certainly” the “ability to develop, 
hone, and deliver arguments about the interpretation of contracts and statutes.”   
  Garner’s proposed remedy, unsurprisingly, is better facility discussing the text of contracts and 
statutes as he endorses greater use of canons of construction addressing word meaning, particularly the 
ordinary-meaning canon, the “negative-implication” canon (a/k/a expression unius est exclusion alterius), 
the last-antecedent canon, the associated-words canon, and the surplusage canon. The latter posits that 
“[i]f possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect.  None should needlessly be given an 
interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.”).  
  A full assessment of these canons and their ability to mislead is beyond the scope of this article.  
The primary defect of almost all canons of construction addressing word meaning is that they are often 
inaccurate in particular situations and arguably rest on the completely unrealistic premises about the 
drafting of legal documents.  Canons are problematic to the extent they suggest that writers of contract 
4
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has not been displaced.9  Most scholars regard that the Restatement 
(Second) of Contract’s construction methodology as fully accepted in 
only a minority of states.10   
In short, textualism has been resilient and ascendant in the 40 years of 
the post-Restatement era.11  One need only briefly search the case reports 
to find example after example of courts saying that their task is limited to 
reading the text of the document at issue,12 or it is not the court’s job to 
 
forms or statutes never speak redundantly, always appreciate the connotative value of words in a series, 
always remember to include everything that should be in a list, and know the rules of grammar cold.  
Canons, like policy text itself, should not be treated as talismanic but applied in conjunction with other 
interpretative factors. 
 9.   A similar phenomenon followed the alleged dethroning of legal formalism by the legal realist 
movement.  The prevailing narrative is that legal formalism dominated American law until the rise of the 
legal realism movement in the 1920s and 1930s which immediately destabilized the dominance of 
formalism and eventually dethroned it, as expressed in the oft-quoted comment that “we are all realists 
now.”  Although formalism was not eliminated or repealed in the manner of a discredited scientific theory, 
legal formalism was scaled back, modified, or fused with legal realist insights in what might be called the 
Harvard Legal Process school of thought that dominated American law at mid-Century.  We would also 
characterize much non-formalist legal reasoning as functionalist.  See  STEMPEL, KNUTSEN, & SWISHER, 
supra note 2, § 2.03 (5th ed. 2020); Peter N. Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off 
the Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1991). See also TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, 
INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 29 (2017) (regarding distinction as “useful” and 
noting applications).  Others would term it instrumentalism.  See, e.g., BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. 
STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 5-15 (1994). Or a matter of “text versus context.” James M. Fischer, 
Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation? Text versus Context, 24 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 995 (1992). For contract law in particular, the prevailing view is that the more functionalist or 
contextualist contract construction of the 1950-1980 time period has been replaced in substantial degree 
by a neo-classical approach that is both more formalist and more textualist than the Second Restatement 
and much of the caselaw of the 1950-1980 era.  Fully discussing and assessing this history is beyond the 
scope of this article and a project in itself.  See generally CONTRACT, LAW OF, OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF AMERICAN POLITICAL AND LEGAL HISTORY (2012); (Donald T. Critchlow & Philip R. VanderMeer, 
eds.) at 188-92; JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 
(1992); KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT (1990).     
 10.  See PERILLO, supra note 4, § 3.12 at 142-43 (noting that “the Restatement (Second) is 
generally in accord with Corbin” but that courts have only “warily” applied the reasonable expectations 
aspect of the Restatement (e.g., 211), usually limiting it to “ambiguities and inconspicuous language”) 
(citation omitted).   
 11.  See John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 869 (2002) (noting that rise in contextual or functional approach to contract construction was never 
as dramatic as posited by critics and counter-revolution of sorts in which courts continued or even 
increased emphasis on text of contract documents); Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost 
Everything You May or May Not Want to Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 577 (2001) 
(noting increase in contract litigation and its frequent disposition by motion practice based on judicial 
finding of sufficiently clear text); Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract 
Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (2000) (noting dominance of objective theory 
and its implicit empowerment of courts to decide cases based on judges’ assessment of whether contract 
document text admits of more than one reasonable reading).  See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 1.7 
(reviewing history of academic debate over nature of contract law, contract theory, and approaches to 
adjudicating contract disputes). 
 12.  See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 
527 (1947) (also published as a monograph by Association of the Bar of the City of New York based on 
address of the same name) (“Read the statute.  Read the statute.  Read the statute”).  Less often quoted 
5
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“rewrite” a contract.13  As in the public debate over constitutional law, 
“strict constructionist” judges are celebrated,14 and the legal literature 
teems with the view that close reading of text is required to provide the 
certainty and predictability required by law, commerce, and society at 
large.15   
 
and appreciated is Justice Frankfurter’s more nuanced view that “the notion that because the words of a 
statute are plain the meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious over-simplification.”  United States v. 
Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  See also Frankfurter, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 
at 528-35 (noting variety of means of reading and understanding statutory text). 
  For an interesting observation that supports the view of de-emphasizing the primacy of text, 
see Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Not Reading the Statutes, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 283, 284 (2007) 
(noting potential differences between statutes as enacted and as codified and that Frankfurter read the 
former) (“The Code is – no disrespect intended – a Frankenstein’s Monster of session laws.  The Code is 
made by taking the session laws, hacking them to pieces, rearranging them, and stitching them back 
together in a way that gives them false life.  Many pieces are altered, and many others are thrown away.  
The result is something like a Cliffs Notes guide to the real law.”).  See also id at 291-92. 
 13.  See, e.g., Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 753 (Tex. 2006) (“courts must enforce 
the contract as made by the parties, and cannot make a new contract for them”);  HECI Exploration Co. 
v. Neel, 982 S.W.23d 744, 753 (Tex. 2006) (“Our decisions have repeatedly emphasized that courts 
‘cannot make contracts for [the] parties.’”) (quoting Gulf Prod. Co. v. Kishi, 103 S.W.2d 965, 968 (Tex. 
1937), which in turn quotes Freeport Sulphur Co. v. Am. Sulphur Royalty Co. of Tex. 6 S.W.2d 1039, 
1490; In Re Arbitration Between Argonaut Midwest Ins. Co. v. Gen. Reinsurance Corp., ); Fernandez v. 
Homestar at Miller Cove, Inc., 935 So.2d 547, 551 (Fla. App. 2006) (courts are “powerless to rewrite [a] 
contract to make it more reasonable or advantageous to one of the parties…or to substitute [the court’s] 
judgments for that of the parties to the contract in order to relieve one of the parties form the apparent 
hardships of an improvident bargain.”  This sentiment is sufficiently strong that it also discourages courts 
from severing portions of a statute or contract that violates law or policy.  See David H. Gans, Severability 
as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639 (2008); John Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 
203 (1993).  See, e.g., Golden Road Motor Inn v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151 (Nev. 2016) (court finds restrictive 
covenant overbroad and refuses to revise or “blue pencil” to bring covenant in compliance with public 
policy limits) (decision later legislatively overruled in part by Nev. Rev. Stat. § 613.195(5) requiring 
judicial editing of overbroad restrictive covenant to conform to legal limits). 
 14.  In the arena of lay politics, the standard statement by politicians appointing judges or of 
judicial candidates is that they will apply the law as written and not engage in “judicial activism.”  See, 
e.g., DAVID MCKAY, AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 293 (2009) (“One of Richard Nixon’s 1968 
campaign pledges had been to replaced the liberals of the Warren Court with ‘strict constructionists’, or 
conservatives less prone to the advancement of civil rights and liberties characteristic of the Warren era.”); 
Reuters Staff, Trump to nominate ‘strict constructionist’ to Supreme Court: Pence, Reuters (Jan 26, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/U38Y-DGDY  (characterizing “strict construction” as “a manner of interpreting the U.S. 
Constitution using a literal and narrow definition of language in the document without regard to changes 
that have occurred in American society since the 18th century document was written.”); Jeffrey Rosen, 
Can Bush Deliver a Conservative Court? N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2004), available at https://perma.cc/T39J-
66XS  (noting President George W. Bush’s frequent promises to supporters to nominate strict 
constructionists).  
 15.  See Shawn Bayern, Contract Meta-Interpretation, 49 UNIV. CAL.-DAVIS L. REV. 1097 (2016) 
(noting this claim of textualists and response of contextualists; further arguing that parties may have 
different preferences regarding interpretation and courts should determine and apply the preferences of 
particular the contracting parties before the court); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract 
Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 938-39 (2010) (endorsing textualism on the basis of both posited 
judicial restraint and consumption of fewer judicial resources due to reduction in need to consider extrinsic 
evidence); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a collective body”).  See, 
e.g., Maura D. Corrigan, Textualism in Action: Judicial Restraint on the Michigan Supreme Court, 8 TEX. 
6
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Textualism is one of the core orthodoxies of American law and dispute 
resolution, even though both modern cognitive science and practical 
experience have shown its limits.  Undue reverence for text abounds even 
when inapt.16  Deviation from textualism is minimally met with raised 
eyebrows and often condemned as an undue departure from settled law.   
Departures from strict textualism, particularly in insurance cases, are 
often erroneously and unfairly treated as episodes of lawless judicial 
activism or policymaking by judges.  This view is misplaced.  A more 
integrative indicia of contract term meaning does not excessively 
empower judges relative to legislatures, executives, and private parties 
but instead permits courts to help ensure that statutes, contracts, and 
insurance policies function in a manner consistent with the intent, 
purpose, and operation of the assenting parties.    
 
 
REV. L. & POL. 261 (2003) (Chief Justice of Michigan Supreme Court argues for textualist approach to 
constrain judiciary and further democratic values); Clint Bolick, The Case for Legal Textualism, Hoover 
Institution (Feb. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/XCR5-JTUA (Arizona Supreme Court Justice and former 
prominent lawyer for conservative causes argues that “textualist judges provide the greatest possible 
guarantee that the judiciary will safeguard the Constitution and the rule of law.”).   For refutation of the 
textualist claim of stability and neutrality in the context of personal jurisdiction issues, see Peter J. Smith, 
Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883 (2008).   
  Although Judge Easterbrook and Justices Corrigan and Bolick were addressing constitutional 
and statutory interpretation, their assessments are frequently applied to contract textualism, and probably 
for similar reasons, which may explain why it appears that the most vigorous textualists are often political 
conservatives.  To be sure, a political liberal may enjoy giving broad construction to language in order to 
aid a consumer, former employee, or policyholder seeking coverage (e.g., broad application of the “all 
sums” language in the standard CGL policy), but conservatives appear attracted to textualism out of 
concern that departure from policy or other contract document text will result in government interference 
(by the judiciary) somehow interfering with private bargains.  Although we are sympathetic to this 
sentiment, we think it misplaced in many contract disputes, particularly insurance coverage matters where 
product-like policy text is standardized, typically unread (and not available until after sale) and does not 
result from specific negotiation and discussion as in the classic bargain model of contract. 
 16.  See, e.g., Maxine Furs. Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 426 Fed. App’x 687 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(applying Alabama law) (smell of Indian curry from adjacent restaurant prompts suit by fur shop where 
merchandised affected by aroma; restaurant not covered by CGL policy due to pollution exclusion; no 
application of absurd result canon); Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 809 N.W. 2d 529 (Wis. 2012) 
(bat guano deposited in vacation home during off-season falls within pollution exclusion of homeowners 
policy; no application of absurd result canon); Owens v. Owens, 6 S.E. 794 (N.C. 1888) (wife who is 
accessory to husband’s murder can nonetheless obtain distribution of property); Dan v. Brown, 4 Cow. 
483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825) (literal language of will applied in spite of beneficiary killing testator);  (same 
re beneficiary of life insurance policy).  This view became increasingly recognized as wrong after Riggs 
v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 191 (N.Y. 1889), which created a common law “slayer’s rule” (albeit over a 
dissent).  Even after Riggs, enough courts were hesitant to depart from textual literalism to require 
legislation codifying the slayer’s rule, which is now the norm.  See John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property 
by Wilfully Killing Another – A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715 (1936).    
  See also Tumlinson v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 775 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1989) (written term seemingly clear on its face may be deemed ambiguous if literal application renders 
an absurd result);  Linda D. Jellum, But That Is Absurd!  Why Specific Absurdity Undermines Textualism, 
76 BROOK. L. REV. 917 (2011) (collecting examples of application of absurd result canon in context of 
statutory construction).  
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After a preliminary sketch of the preferred Integrative Approach to 
insurance policy construction, this Article briefly17 examines textualism 
in the insurance context and finds it flawed.  This Article then outlines the 
proper role of the judiciary as an institution that should assist the 
operation of contracts and statutes.  Courts need not be cabined by 
textualism to “stay in their lane” relative to other branches as well as the 
decision-making preferences of the parties.18 Rather, courts can adopt a 
broader, more Integrative Approach to construction without violating 
traditional norms of the judicial role.19 Finally, this Article proposes a 
workable Integrative Approach to the construction of insurance policies 
and other contracts. This approach will enable judges to vindicate the 
objectives of these instruments. 
The integrative solution is not radical. It attempts to draw the legal 
profession back to reality, where risk management principles, commerce, 
and social institutions all necessarily impact the construction of meaning 
in a policy term.  Textualism’s staunch resistance to the value added by 
contextual information is comparatively extreme. 
I.  PRECURSORS TO THE INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 
The magnetic push and pull between textual and contextual approaches 
 
 17.  The shortcomings of textualism would support a longer discussion or an entire article or book.  
We hope, however, that we present enough criticism to persuade readers that embracing a narrow 
textualism risks more erroneous contract construction than do broader approaches such as the very broad 
Integrative Approach we champion. See also Mark A. Lemley, Chief Justice Webster, 106 IOWA L. REV. 
299 (2020) (criticizing textual literalism and reliance on dictionaries); William N. Eskridge, The New 
Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra 
note 7) (criticizing hidden use of value judgments in purportedly objective textual analyses); Miranda 
McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say, An Empirical Investigation of Justices Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning 
Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 129 (2008) (finding substantial use of discretion in 
assessing meaning despite Justice’s claim of constraint in assessing textual meaning); James Brudney & 
Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 
1 (2005) (finding selective, inconsistent use of linguistic canons favored by textualists); Ellen Aprill, The 
Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998) (finding 
inconsistent use of dictionaries in textualist opinions). 
 18.  The phrase “freedom of contract” has become something of a cliché but at its core contains a 
powerful public policy goal:  allow individuals and entities to engage in transactions that are viewed as 
mutually beneficial without excessive government interference.  But contracting parties are agreeing upon 
purchase of certain things, services or objectives rather than agreeing on documentary language.  The 
language of contract documents, although important, is not all-important, particularly when such language 
is unlikely to be read and analyzed and when disclosures are of limited efficacy.  See generally OMRI 
BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF 
MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014). 
 19.  Again attacking conventional wisdom, we do not think the judiciary exceeds its role when 
judges do more than assess the face of the text of contract documents (or statutes for that matter).  Rather, 
judges are more true to their proper role in a coordinate branch of government when they are more readily 
able to construe insurance policies and other contracts in a manner that facilitates their effective operation 
as envisioned by the parties and which serves the context of the transaction represented by the contract. 
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to insurance policy interpretation is not new. That the United States 
appears to have landed on the textualist side of contract interpretation 
questions is also not new. But that has not always been the case in all 
American jurisdictions. Rather, three major and influential legal episodes 
proposed contextualist approaches in the past and developed compelling 
safeguards around the trappings of textualism. However, these 
developments, over time, became cabined by the textualism movement. 
In short, contextualism did not stick. The Integrative Approach proposed 
in this Article builds on the solid foundations of historical, widely 
accepted approaches to create a modern comprehensive approach to 
insurance policy construction.  
A.  The California Supreme Court’s Pacific Gas & Electric v. Thomas 
Drayage Opinion 
In the 1968 decision Pacific Gas & Electric v. G.W. Thomas Drayage 
& Rigging Co.,20 the California Supreme Court adopted a more lenient 
attitude to admitting extrinsic evidence of contractual meaning compared 
to the “plain meaning” practices that had come before. The Thomas 
Drayage Court signaled that context matters.  Courts cannot merely look 
at the text of a contract to determine meaning, by imbuing whatever the 
judge “thought” was the “plain meaning” of the text. Though subsequent 
cases have been less openly contextualist and more textualist in rhetoric, 
the Thomas Drayage decision, written by celebrated jurist Justice Roger 
J. Traynor21 remains good law in California. Although many subsequent 
state Supreme Court opinions have been more textualist in tone22 and 
application,23  the state’s jurisprudence as a whole has retained a relatively 
 
 20.  442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968). 
 21.  Thomas Drayage was authored by the celebrated jurist Justice Roger J. Traynor, a former 
University of California-Berkeley law professor, primarily known as a tax expert when he was appointed 
to the California Supreme Court in 1940.  He is today largely remembered for leading tort and contract 
opinions written while he was on the Court as either an Associate Justice (1940-1964) or as Chief Justice 
(1964-1970).  See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (urging use of strict product 
liability in concurring opinion); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) 
(establishing strict product liability as state law); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (establishing 
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress); Drennan v. Star Paving Co, 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) 
(permitting use of promissory estoppel to create contract obligations); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 
145 (Cal. 1965) (leading opinion discussing the “economic loss” doctrine and its limitation on tort-style 
remedies for product failure).  See also Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (striking down state 
miscegenation statute); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942) (eliminating mutuality 
requirement for defensive use of collateral estoppel).  
 22.     Although Thomas Drayage remains good law in California, its rate of invocation has 
declined as more recent cases have become more popular citations for summarizing state contract 
construction doctrine.  But these cases, although perhaps not emphasizing receptivity to extrinsic 
evidence, have not retreated entirely from the Traynor formula.  
 23.  See, e.g., Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc., 139 P.3d 56, 58-60 (Cal. 2006) (citing Thomas 
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contextualist approach in spite of reduced citation to the Thomas Drayage 
opinion.24 
In Thomas Drayage, the parties entered a contract to replace the metal 
cover of the plaintiff’s steam turbine. The defendant agreed to perform 
the work “at (its) own risk and expense” and to “indemnify” the plaintiff 
“against all loss, damage, expense and liability resulting from . . . injury 
to property, arising out of or in any way connected with the performance 
of this contract.”25 During the course of the work, the cover fell and 
damaged the rotor of the turbine. The plaintiff sued for the repair cost on 
the theory that the contract indemnified the plaintiff for damage to all 
property regardless of ownership. However, the defendant argued that the 
clause was meant only to cover injury to property of third parties and not 
the plaintiff’s property. The defendant supported its argument with 
admissions from plaintiff’s agents and evidence regarding the course of 
dealing based on its past contracting practices. The lower court refused 
evidence related to the intent of the contractual terms in the agreement. 
Instead, the lower court construed the terms based on the court’s 
determination of the term’s plain meaning. 
The Thomas Drayage Court held that, by failing to admit extrinsic 
evidence to interpret what the parties meant by this indemnity clause, a 
court: 
determines the meaning of the instrument in accordance with the ‘extrinsic 
evidence of the judge’s own linguistic education and experience.’ (3 
Corbin on Contracts (1960 ed.) (1964 Supp. s 579, p. 225, fn. 56).) The 
 
Drayage) (finding employment at will and discharge at any time language in job contract clear and not 
susceptible to being construed as contract requiring cause for discharge as advocated by employee 
plaintiff) (but see 139 P.3d at 62 (Baxter, J., joined by Moreno, J.), refusing to join majority’s “general 
endorsement” of Thomas Drayage); Bank of the West, infra, note 24 at 552-53 (finding policyholder’s 
proffered interpretation inconsistent with context of transaction and insurance product as well as precedent 
from other jurisdictions); Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 682 P.2d 1100, 1104-05 (Cal. 1984) (finding 
policy language not receptive to construction insured sought to place upon it through extrinsic evidence; 
also finding evidence unpersuasive); Sarnecky v. D’Amato Conversano, Inc., 2018 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 899 (Feb. 8, 2018) at *29-*30 (citing Thomas Drayage) (rejecting proffer of “parol evidence” 
(arguably extrinsic evidence rather than parol) on ground that text language was clear and subjective party 
intent insufficient to vary clear text); Edward W. Scott Elec. Co. v. Thompson Pac. Constr., Inc., 2018 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 768 (Jan. 30, 2018) at *20-*24 (citing Thomas Drayage) (finding text not 
“reasonably susceptible” to construction advocated by litigant).  
 24.  See, e.g., Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch. Inc. 900 P.2d 619, 627 (Cal. 1995) (focusing on facial 
ambiguity of policy text and defining ambiguity as language capable of two or more reasonable 
constructions, a situation that justifies consideration of extrinsic evidence and application of contra 
proferentem doctrine in which unclear language is resolved against drafter of the language); Bank of the 
West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 545-46 (Cal. 1992) (setting forth similar ground rules of contract 
construction).  See also MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 31 Cal. 4th 635, 648 (2003) (discussing 
insurance contract interpretation norm that exclusions are narrowly construed against insurer and in favor 
of policyholder). The California Supreme Court last cited Thomas Drayage in Riverisland Cold Storage, 
Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 321 (Cal. 2013). 
 25.  Thomas Drayage, 442 P.2d at 643. 
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exclusion of testimony that might contradict the linguistic background of 
the judge reflects a judicial belief in the possibility of perfect verbal 
expression. (9 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) s 2461, p. 187.) This 
belief is a remnant of a primitive faith in the inherent potency and inherent 
meaning of words.26 
The court held that the threshold question for admitting extrinsic 
evidence of word meaning should not be whether the word appears to the 
court to be plain and unambiguous. Instead, the test should be whether 
“the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the 
language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.”27 For the court, the 
relevance of the parties’ intentions are paramount because words “do not 
have absolute and constant referents” and have no “fixed meaning.”28 
Extrinsic evidence should be admitted because courts cannot “presuppose 
a degree of verbal precision and stability our language has not attained.”29  
According to Justice Traynor, there is real danger in leaving a 
contractual term’s plain  meaning solely to a court’s discretion, because 
courts could mistakenly attribute a meaning that the parties never 
intended.30 Therefore, “rational interpretation requires at least a 
preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the 
intention of the parties.”31 That evidence includes testimony about the 
surrounding circumstances of the making of the agreement, as well as 
evidence of the object, nature and subject matter of the agreement. 
Although the decision has its critics,32 it has not created the problems  
of which it is sometimes accused.33  Contract and insurance law function 
 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 644.  
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id.at 645. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  See, e.g., Trident Center v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(purporting to grudgingly apply California law after considerable criticism of Thomas Drayage).  But, as 
discussed herein, Judge Alex Kosinski in Trident Center paints a misleading picture of California law as 
well as misapplying it.   
 33.  For example, the Trident Center opinion portrayed Thomas Drayage as creating a body of 
California law that made it impossible for commercial actors to rely on contract text.  See 847 F.2d at 569, 
contending that Thomas Drayage: 
“casts a long shadow of uncertainty over all transactions negotiated and executed under the law of 
California.”  [Agreements with] contract language that is devoid of ambiguity [are subject to] 
“costly and protracted litigation [that] cannot be avoided if one party has a strong enough motive 
for challenging the contract.  While this rule creates much business for lawyers and an occasional 
windfall to some clients, it leads only to frustration and delay for most litigants and clogs already 
overburdened courts. 
It also chips away at the foundation of our legal system.  By giving credence to the idea that words 
are inadequate to express concepts, [Thomas Drayage] undermines the basic principle that 
language provides meaningful constraint on public and private conduct.  If we are unwilling to 
say that parties, dealing face to face, can come up with language that binds them, how can we send 
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more than adequately in California, the nation’s largest state34 with the 
world’s sixth largest economy.35   
 
anyone to jail for violating statutes consisting of mere words . . . How can courts ever enforce 
decrees . . . ? 
Although impressive rhetorically, the statement was hyperbole in 1988 and looks even more ridiculous 
40 years later in light of the continued economic growth and legal importance of California that seems 
unlikely to have occurred if the state was really saddled with unworkably unpredictable contract law.   
  Judge Kosinski was – by his own admission – engaging in a bit of a vanity attack on Justice 
Traynor.  See Alex Kosinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 298-
99 (2000) (“I had grown tired of law clerks who thought California Chief Justice Traynor was the cat’s 
pajamas because he didn’t believe that any contract could be interpreted without the use of extrinsic 
evidence.”). 
  Perhaps most disturbing about Trident Center is that the case is simply wrong on its own terms.  
One need not apply an external critique to Trident Center.  Trident Center on its face is internally 
inconsistent.  The opinion states (847 F.3d at 567) that “the clause on which Trident relies [in seeking to 
accelerate payment of a loan without penalty] is not on its face reasonably susceptible to Trident’s 
proffered interpretation.”  According to the plain language of the text, “[w]hether to accelerate repayment 
of the loan in the event of default is entirely [the lender’s] decision.  The contract [document text] makes 
this clear at several points.”  The court found it “difficult to imagine language that could more clearly 
assign to [the lender] the exclusive right to decide whether to declare a default, whether and when to 
accelerate, and whether, having chosen to take advantage of any of its remedies, to rescind the process 
before its completion.” 
  In other words, the language of the loan agreement is not reasonably susceptible to a 
construction that would allow the borrower (Trident Center was a joint venture of two law firms to 
purchase an office building in West Los Angeles where the firms continue to operate) to accelerate 
repayment of the loan without penalty, an issue that arose because the loan carried a high interest rate and 
rates had dropped substantially within a few years of the making of the loan.   
  The finding of no susceptibility to permitting prepayment without penalty should have ended 
the case and avoided any significant detour for discussion of extrinsic evidence.  Thomas Drayage 
explicitly states that, to be permitted, extrinsic evidence must advance a construction of the text at issue 
for which the text is reasonably susceptible.  The Trident Center court ignores this aspect of Thomas 
Drayage, despite its finding of textual clarity in the loan agreement. 
  Trident Center, despite its strident rhetoric, fails to make the case against Thomas Drayage. 
Trident Center likewise fails to undermine the case for the Restatement (Second) approach to contract 
interpretation or this article’s proposed Integrative Approach. 
 34.  See California Passes France as World’s 6th-Largest Economy, FORTUNE, June 18, 2016.  
But see Geoffrey Miller, Bargains BiCoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 
(2010) (noting business preference for choosing New York contract law because of its perceived greater 
textual orientation than that of California). 
 35.  In our view, California contract and insurance law function pretty well.  At a minimum, the 
state’s approach to contract construction does not appear to have thwarted growth and commercial 
development.  To be sure, one can argue that California would be even more of an economic powerhouse 
were it not saddled with Thomas Drayage and its tolerant approach to extrinsic evidence.  But we are 
skeptical.  And insurers win more than their share of coverage disputes in California.  See, e.g., PPG 
Industries, Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652 (Cal. 1999) (insurer that acted in bad faith in failing 
to defend is not responsible for punitive damages component of award against policy); Buss v. Superior 
Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997) (insurer that defended case where only one of 19 causes of action was 
potentially covered may seek repayment of portion of fees). 
  Buss is additionally interesting because it not only ruled for the insurer in permitting it to seek 
recoupment of counsel fees but in doing so rejected a strict textual analysis in favor of what the court 
implicitly regarded as a more equitable approach in a case such as Buss in which the insurer defended a 
case in which only one of the nineteen claims for relief was potentially covered.  But the language of the 
policy in question, standard form CGL language, states that the insurer has a duty to defend “suits.”  It 
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B.  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts,36 promulgated by the 
American Law Institute in 1981, took a decidedly contextualist approach 
to contract interpretation, tracking the same reasoning as the California 
Supreme Court in Thomas Drayage. It indicated that courts should 
interpret the meaning of contractual terms in light of the drafting 
circumstances, with the “principle purpose of the parties” given “great 
weight.”37 An agreement should be interpreted as a whole, and the 
“generally prevailing meaning” of words at issue controls “unless a 
different intention is manifested.”38 The Restatement also authorizes 
courts to weigh evidence regarding parties’ courses of contractual 
performance.39 Finally, the intention of the contracting parties should be 
interpreted as consistent with relevant course of performance, course of 
dealing, or usage of trade evidence.40 
The meaning, as derived from the intentions of the contracting parties, 
thus reigns supreme in both the Restatement approach and Thomas 
Drayage. The Restatement adopts a form of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine as found in insurance law.41 
 
does not say the duty to defend is limited to potentially covered claims.   
 36.  See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 200-229 (1981). 
 37.  Id. § 202(1). 
 38.  Id. § 202(3) (a). 
 39.  Id. § 202(4). 
 40.  Id. § 202(5). 
 41.  The reasonable expectations of contracting parties is an important tool of contract 
interpretation used by almost all courts in varying degrees.  But under a strong form of the reasonable 
expectations approach (sometimes labeled a reasonable-expectations “doctrine”), policyholder 
expectations of coverage will be honored by the court even if policy language is clearly to the contrary, 
particularly where the language, even if clear, is not prominently displayed in the insurance policy or 
related documents.  The doctrine is most associated with Harvard Law Professor Robert E. Keeton, later 
a federal judge – See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Rights At Variance With Policy Provisions – Pt. I, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970) (focusing on coverage issues); Keeton, Insurance Rights At Variance With 
Policy Provisions – Pt. II, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1970) (focusing on claims handling and settlement) – 
but has spawned a large body of literature.  See, e.g., Peter N. Swisher, Symposium Introduction,  5 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 1 (1998). 
  To summarize at the risk of over-simplifying, there is a “strong” form of the reasonable 
expectations approach, that occasionally appears in judicial decisions.  See, e.g., Atwater Creamery Co. 
v. Western National Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985) (refusing to enforce theft provisions 
requiring “visible marks of forced entry” for coverage despite clarity of language).  But this is not the 
norm.  See Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323 (1986) 
(noting initial enthusiasm for doctrine in wake of Keeton article but subsequent decline in use). Rather,, 
policyholder reasonable expectations are often only considered  if policy language is ambiguous See 
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTSEN , STEMPEL & KNUTSEN ON INSURANCE COVERAGE § 4.08 (4th 
ed. 2016); BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE 
DISPUTES § 2.04    (16th ed. 2016); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the 
Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of the Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 
181 (1998) (noting use of modest form of reasonable expectations analysis across spectrum of contracts 
and arguing for greater willingness to use strong form of approach for insurance disputes).   
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C.  The Pre-2018 Drafts of the Restatement of the Law of Liability 
Insurance 
Prior to its passage by the American Law Institute in 2019, the 
Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance (“RLLI”)42 went through 
numerous revisions. In the early pre-2018 drafts, the RLLI conveyed a 
more lenient attitude toward extrinsic evidence on issues of insurance 
policy construction than that of many courts and commentators. The pre-
2018 RLLI position mirrored the California Supreme Court’s decision in 
Thomas Drayage.43 Notwithstanding that the RLLI was merely endorsing 
a contract construction approach long used by California, which was 
consistent with the ALI’s own Contracts Restatement, RLLI critics opined 
that its contract construction sections were an invitation to anarchy that 
would irreparably destabilize not only insurance law but American 
commerce in general.44  The draft RLLI proposal, though quite deferential 
to text (arguably more than the Restatement (Second) of Contracts), was 
attacked for paying insufficient homage to the words of an insurance 
policy. 
The December 2017 RLLI draft stopped short of embracing the 
contextual approach of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  Instead, 
it attempted to affirm deference to text but permit judicial consideration 
of sufficiently instructive non-textual information about the meaning of a 
disputed term. § 3 of the December 2017 RLLI draft became a lightning 
rod for textualist rancor, despite its innocuous title, “The Presumption in 
Favor of the Plain Meaning of Standard Form Insurance Policy Terms.”45  
 
 42.  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIABILITY INSURANCE (2019) 
(“RLLI”). 
 43.  Pacific Gas & Electric v. Thomas Drayage, 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968). 
 44.  Outside the context of the RLLI, deviations from textualism are often attacked by legal 
formalists and political conservatives, although we do not think the Integrative Approach to contract 
construction proposed in this article is inherently politically liberal . . . or even anti-establishment.  In our 
view, it is textualism that is more easily open to manipulation by judges than are the broader approaches 
to contract construction such as the Integrative Approach.   
  Simply put, it is easier to twist (consciously or unconsciously) words than it is to twist a variety 
of facts.  A more comprehensive inquiry into contract meaning is often bounded by empirical data (e.g., 
evidence of party intent or purpose; information about background, history, or impact).  This may be what 
has made textualism popular with conservatives who want to read text narrowly to limit the reach of 
legislation.  See, e.g., General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (Supreme Court in opinion by Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist finds that pregnancy discrimination does not violate Title VII in that it is not 
disparate treatment in that only one sex can become pregnant; justifies ruling on textual and formalist 
grounds). 
 45.  Of the roughly 200 comments posted to the section of the ALI website devoted to the RLLI, 
more than 150 were from insurers or insurer counsel.  Many insurer comments attacked § 3.  The common 
thread of the criticism was that the § 3 methodology was not sufficiently deferential to plain meaning.  
Beyond this, a number of the comments posited – apparently in all seriousness – that the § 3 methodology 
undermined the very fabric of American contract law.  As discussed below, we are tempted to say such 
criticism borders on the ridiculous – except that it crosses the border into the ridiculous. 
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It put forth the following approach to insurance policy construction:  
(1) The plain meaning of an insurance policy term is the single meaning, if 
any to which the language of the term is reasonably susceptible when 
applied to the claim at issue, in the context of the insurance policy as a 
whole, without reference to extrinsic evidence regarding the meaning of 
the term.  If the term does not have a plain meaning, it is interpreted under 
the rules stated in §4 [regarding treatment of ambiguous terms]. 
 
(2) An insurance-policy term is interpreted according to its plain meaning 
as defined in subsection (1), unless extrinsic evidence demonstrates to the 
court that a reasonable person in the policyholder’s position would give the 
term a different meaning.  That different meaning must be one to which the 
language of the term is reasonably susceptible in light of the 
circumstances.46 
§ 4 of the December 2017 RLLI regarding “Ambiguous Terms” generated 
similar heat:47  
(1) An insurance-policy term is ambiguous if there is more than one 
meaning to which the language of the term is reasonably susceptible when 
applied to the claim in question, without reference to extrinsic evidence 
regarding the meaning of the term. 
 
(2) When an insurance-policy term is ambiguous, the term is interpreted in 
favor of the party that did not supply the term, unless the other party 
persuaded that court that this interpretation is unreasonable in light of 
extrinsic evidence.   
 
(3) A standard-form insurance-policy term is interpreted as if it were 
supplied by the insurer, without regard to which party actually supplied the 
term, unless the policyholder has agreed in writing to a contrary 
interpretative rule, in which case any term actually supplied by the 
policyholder will be interpreted using that contrary interpretative rule.48 
 Adverse insurer reactions to the contract construction provisions of the 
December 2017 RLLI were ill-taken and a bit puzzling. December 2017 
RLLI § 3 raised the most concern among insurers not only because it goes 
more directly to the interpretative enterprise but also because it did not 
embrace the textual jurisprudence favored by many insurers.  However, § 
 
 46.  RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIABILITY INSURANCE § 3 (AM. L. INST. Proposed Official Draft 
2017).  
 47.   The gist of the criticism of the pre-2018 RLLI contract construction proposal argued that 
these provisions  adopted an unduly favorable attitude toward extrinsic evidence and made for too 
powerful a version of the traditional contra proferentem rule.  The criticism is ill-taken.  The § 4 approach 
to ambiguity is consistent with mainstream contract jurisprudence.  See PERILLO, supra note 4, at § 3.10; 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, at §§ 7.7-7.14. 
 48.  RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 46, at § 4.  
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3 neither adopted a strong form of the reasonable expectations doctrine 
nor supported characterizations of the insurance policy that departed from 
the contract model.  Rather, § 3 adopted—without expressly saying so—
the approach taken by the California Supreme Court in Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage Co.,49 in which the Court declared: 
The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a 
written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and 
unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to 
prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably 
susceptible. 
 
A rule that would limit the determination of the meaning of a written 
instrument to its four-corners merely because it seems to the court to be 
clear and unambiguous, would either deny the relevance of the intention of 
the parties or presuppose a degree of verbal precision and stability our 
language has not attained.50 
The pre-2018 version of RLLI § 3(2) did not openly advertise its 
embrace of Thomas Drayage and characterized the decision as one 
following what the RLLI termed the “contextual” approach.51  But it is 
difficult to see much distinction between the two formulations.  Although 
the similarity may be lost on many readers, insurers and other textualists 
understood that RLLI § 3(2) opened the door to more judicial 
consideration of extrinsic evidence than they preferred.  Consequently, 
they attacked this portion with considerable intensity. 
But the similarity, if not outright congruence, between Thomas 
Drayage and the December 2017 RLLI § 3(2) logically should be seen as 
a plus rather than a minus for the provision.  Not only is the Thomas 
Drayage approach reasonable and preferable to rigid textualism, but it has 
also proven workable for fifty years in a large jurisdiction. Thomas 
Drayage has been cited more than 1,000 times in subsequent cases. Just 
 
 49.  442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968). 
 50.  442 P.2d at 644 (citations omitted). 
 51.  See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIABILITY INSURANCE § 3, Reporters’ Note a. (AM. L. 
INST.  2017)  (“The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written 
instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether it 
appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its fact, but whether the offered evidence is relevant 
to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.”)(quoting Thomas 
Drayage).   
  By early 2018, the adverse reactions by powerful ALI constituencies resulted in the RLLI 
moving toward a more traditionally textual black letter § 3.  Insurer opposition to the Section and to the 
RLLI generally spiked when it became know that the undertaking was changing from a Principles Project 
to a Restatement.  As the ALI explains well in its description of Restatements approved by the ALI 
Council in January 2015 (reprinted at pp. x-xi of the RLLI), Restatements are not limited to endorsing the 
majority rule but may favor a better rule of law so long as the proposal enjoys some judicial support.  And 
pre-2018 § 3(b) enjoyed substantial judicial support.  But § 3 nonetheless triggered substantial insurer and 
corporate opposition. 
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as important, its enunciation of the treatment of text and receptiveness to 
extrinsic information continues to be cited. 
The RLLI has been changed from a document supporting California’s 
Thomas Drayage approach to one adopting a neoclassical deference to 
the text of the insurance policy and presumably related contract 
documents as well.  Although this is not complete retrogression, neither 
is it progress.52 More importantly, it does not provide the optimal 
methodology for construing insurance policies or resolving coverage 
disputes.  Of the available choices before it, the ALI Council opted for the 
worst contract construction methodology.  The December 2017 RLLI § 
3, the Restatement (Second) of Contract’s contextual approach, and the 
Thomas Drayage approach to extrinsic evidence are all superior 
methodologies to the simplistic and unrealistic textualist approach to 
plain meaning. Each is a precursor to the Integrative Approach to 
insurance policy construction. Unfortunately, these more promising 
approaches were arguably abandoned in the later stages of the RLLI 
process. 
II.  THE INTEGRATIVE APPROACH: A PREVIEW 
Insurance policy construction would benefit from an approach that 
begins with an anchoring inquiry into the purpose of the policy: the 
context of the policy and its sale as well as the underwriting and risk 
management intent of the product as understood by insurer and 
policyholder. At the outset, an interpreter should understand what the 
transaction memorialized on the paper was designed to accomplish in 
terms of risk management objectives, response to litigation, anticipated 
scenarios, distribution of the risk of uncertainty, scope of contractual 
commitment, and limitations.53   
 
 
 52.  See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 51, at Note a.  
 53.  For insurance policy sales, particularly to consumers, there is relatively little bargaining over 
terms and little discussion of specific policy language.  Consequently, it will often be particularly 
inappropriate to focus on policy text alone.  See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social 
Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2010) (advocating consideration of 
socioeconomic function of insurance policy at issue as interpretative tool in addition to text or other indicia 
of meaning); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 203 (2010) 
(noting degree to which standardized insurance policies function as a form of private legislation and 
suggesting more express use of statutory construction methodology in resolution of insurance coverage 
disputes); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TRIAL & INS. L.J. 813 (2009) (noting 
that typical insurance policies are purchased by most policyholders as a product intended for a specific 
purpose of risk management and protection which enhances case for reasonable expectations analysis); 
Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007) (noting product-like characteristics of insurance policies and arguing that 
that supports more express economic analysis as interpretative tool).  
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This understanding includes some appreciation of the market from 
which the purchase of insurance emerged as well as the overall setting of 
the transaction and the purpose of the agreement. For example, a 
particular type of risk, such as liquor liability, may be well-established as 
its own market with its own product, which supports application of the 
liquor liability exclusion found in a standard commercial general liability 
(CGL) policy despite arguments that this may run counter to the 
expectations of the policyholder.54 
Reading the policy terms in light of this background information, and 
in the context of the whole policy at issue, is key to informing the 
interpretive exercise.  This lays the backdrop for the larger context of the 
parties’ transaction. The internal policy definition of a term is itself given 
great weight, but an Integrative Approach would allow courts to deploy 
several legal canons (many specific to insurance) in a quest for equitable 
meaning of a disputed term.  Following the approach, a court would: 
a) construe the agreement broadly with an eye to the policy’s risk 
management objectives (the context of the agreement, the parties’ 
intentions, etc.); 
b) read and assess the text of the policy in light of this background context, 
and in light of the policy as a whole; 
c) apply standard insurance canons of construction to terms under review; 
i. coverage grants should be construed broadly (and burden of 
persuasion on the policyholder) 
ii. construe exclusions from coverage strictly and narrowly  
iii. policy provisions that operate in the nature of exclusions should 
thus be treated like exclusions; 
iv. insurers bear the burden of proving the applicability of an 
exclusion;55 
v. exclusions should be subject to the reasonable rules of contra 
 
 54.  See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Making Liquor Immunity Worse: Nevada’s Undue Protection of 
Commercial Hosts Evicting Vulnerable and Dangerous Patrons, 14 NEV. L.J. 866, 867-75 (2014) 
(describing history and development of dram shop liability; an insurance market exists for alcohol-serving 
establishments but is relatively “thin” in terms of participants and consumer choice of insurers); Randy 
Maniloff, Broad Interpretation Given to Liquor Liability Exclusion: New ISO Exclusion Not Needed, 
COVERAGE OPINIONS, Vo. 4, Issue 10 (Oct. 28, 2015) (noting consistency of judicial enforcement of 
liquor liability exclusion).  See, e.g., Capital Specialty Ins. Corp. v. PJD Entertainment of Worcester, 126 
F. Supp. 3d 176 (D. Mass. 2015). 
 55.  Broad construction of insuring agreements and narrow construction of exclusions is hornbook 
law as expressed in treatises written by insurer counsel as well as policyholder counsel and law professors.  
See BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE DISPUTES § 2.02 (19th 
ed. 2019); ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 14 (6th 
ed. 2018); EUGENE ANDERSON, JORDAN STANZLER, AND LORELIE MASTERS, INSURANCE COVERAGE 
LITIGATION  § 2.02 at p. 2-23 (2d ed. 2004) (citing cases); PETER KALIS ET AL., THE POLICYHOLDER’S 
GUIDE TO INSURANCE COVERAGE §§ 10.01, 20.04 (2004) (citing cases); STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra 
note 41, § 2.06.  
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proferentem,56 if such terms are ambiguous; 
d) consider the following additional evidence of party intent, 
understanding, objectives57 (not conditional on facial ambiguity of policy 
text): 
i. trade usage, technical manuals, industry materials, drafting 
history;58 
ii. evidence of specific intent of the parties, if available; 
iii. an established course of performance or course of dealing of the 
parties regarding administration of the insurance policy or program in 
question.59 
iv. decisions of other courts construing the same or similar language; 
v. treatises, law review articles and other secondary sources that may 
shed light on meaning; 
e) consider the identity of the policy as something other than a contract (a 
product, private legislation, social instrument or institution and outputs of 
a regulated industry);60 
 
 56.  By “reasonable” rules of contra proferentem, we mean – consistent with the Integrative 
Approach we espouse – use of contra proferentem as a tiebreaker when other indicia of meaning do not 
resolve linguistic uncertainty or establish the proper application of an insurance policy.  See STEMPEL, 
KNUTSEN & SWISHER, supra note 2, at § 2.05;  STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 41, § 4.08 (4th ed. 2016).  
Contra proferentem should in our view be a last resort rather than a first resort. 
 57.  We wish to distinguish, as we think do most observers, between “intent” and “purpose” of an 
insurance policy (or contract or statute generally).  Intent refers to particular evidence of a party’s goal, 
objective, or expectation regarding the transaction.  For example, there may be correspondence between 
the parties that specifically states whether the Pollution Point Power Plant or an uncharted island is within 
or outside the scope of coverage.  Purpose refers to a less specific and more generalized objective of the 
transaction.  For example, a general liability policy is designed to provide a defense claims of policyholder 
negligence during ordinary operations that caused injury to the claimant while product recall insurance is 
a separate product covering not the risk of inflicted injury but the need to remove product from the shelves 
in response to discovery of contamination or related problems.  See, e.g., McNeilab, Inc. v. North River 
Ins. Co., 645 F. Supp. 525 (D.N.J. 1986), aff’d, 831 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1987) (CGL policy does not cover 
recall expenses of Tylenol manufacturer’s removal of product from stores in wake of poisoning/tampering 
problems; court influenced not only by exclusionary language in CGL policy but market practice of selling 
recall insurance as separate product at separate premium). 
 58.  Custom, practice, and trade usage are well-established as appropriate tools for contract 
construction.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 219-222; PERILLO, supra note 4, § 3.17; 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 7.13. 
 59.  These interpretative tools are well-established in law.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS 
§ 223; PERILLO, supra note 4, § 3.17; FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, §§ 3.28, 7.13.  Course of performance 
and course of dealing are often distinguished in that the former tends to refer to conduct in connection 
with a single contract performed over time or a series of closely related contracts while the latter tends to 
refer to a longer and broader range of conduct by the parties in their contractual relations with one another. 
 60.  Consideration of insurance as a product, private legislation, a regulated industry, or a 
socioeconomic instrument has been advanced at some length in academic literature.  See, e.g., Daniel 
Schwarcz, A Product Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Coverage, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT, TRIAL & INS. 
PRAC. L.J. (2008-2009); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
203 (2009-2010); Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2013) 
(identifying conceptions of contract, public utility/regulated industry, product, and governance); Jeffrey 
W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1489 (2010); Erik S. Knutsen, Auto Insurance as Social Contract: Solving Automobile Insurance 
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f) if necessary, consider additional canons of construction or rules of 
grammar;61 
g) if necessary, consider contractual principles such as unconscionability, 
illegality, or public policy;62 
h) to the extent evidence regarding the contextual factors of intent, purpose, 
custom, practice, course of dealing, business practices and the like conflicts 
and has material relevance to the meaning of the policy, make apt use of 
 
Coverage Disputes Through a Public Regulatory Framework, 48 ALBERTA L. REV. 715 (2011) (arguing 
that the regulated and mandatory nature of Canadian automobile liability insurance is akin to a ‘social 
contract’ with society over compensatory rights); Christopher French, Understanding Insurance Policies 
as Non-Contracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing These Unique Financial 
Instruments, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 535 (2017). But courts have been reluctant to openly use these alternative 
or supplemental characterizations of insurance policies as a means of assessing policy meaning.  They are 
on occasion, however, applied as part of a reasonable expectations approach to construing policies.  See, 
e.g., C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co.., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975) (finding property policy 
that purportedly covered theft but not where thief was slick enough to leave no visible marks was not 
adequate insurance product). 
 61.  Canons of construction, although criticized with some frequency, are well established as tools 
for interpretation of contracts and statutes.  The canons tend to divide into canons of word meaning (e.g., 
absent special circumstances, words are to be given the meaning attached by laypersons rather than 
specialists; each term in a contract should be given meaning and not treated as redundant of other terms 
in the contract document) and substantive canons (e.g., contracts should be construed insofar as possible 
to comply with the law).  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION ch. 6 and Appendix B (6th ed. 2020) (dividing canons according to “textual” and 
“substantive” canons).  For a compilation of canons (which are often apply to contracts and statutes), see 
SCALIA & GARNER,  supra note 5, ch. II (2012) (applying categories of “semantic” canons, “syntactic” 
canons, “contextual” canons, “expected-meaning” canons, “government-structuring” canons, “private-
right” canons and “stabilizing” canons); ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra, at 581-89, 595-597, Appendix B, Edwin 
Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 852-55 (1964) 
(identifying ten well-established canons of contract interpretation).  For criticisms of canons generally or 
of particular canons, see ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra, at 426-442; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation 
– In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 806-07 (1983); Karl N. Llewellyn, 
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be 
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 396, 401-06 (1950) (classic article juxtaposing contradictory but equally 
accepted canons of construction).  For defense of canons, see SCALIA & GARNER, supra, note 7.  
  For an empirical examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of canons that buttresses our 
view that textualism can be at least as malleable and result-oriented as consideration of non-textual factors, 
see James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral 
Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 53-69 (2005) (finding that Justices vary in reliance on canons as 
contrasted with legislative history and that “canon usage by justices identified as liberals tends to be linked 
to liberal outcomes, and canon reliance by conservative justices to be associated with conservative 
outcomes.”).  Accord, James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative 
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117 (2008) (finding 
ideological differences in rulings of liberal and conservative Justices associated with differential use of 
canons). 
 62.  These doctrines are not favored in that when invoked to countermand a clear agreement (or, 
more specifically, purportedly clear text in a document memorializing the agreement), they are perceived 
as countermanding the “bargain” struck by the parties.  Nonetheless, these doctrines have substantial 
support in mainstream contract law, particularly when used sparingly and judiciously.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) CONTRACTS, supra note 4, §§ 178-196; PERILLO, supra note 2, § 3.7(e); FARNSWORTH, supra 
note 2, ch. 5. 
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the trial process to resolve disputed issues of fact.63 
No single component of the Integrative Approach is novel. In fact, each 
pays homage to the law of many states, most predominantly to California 
law,64 the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,65 and the pre-2018 drafts of 
the RLLI. The Integrative Approach is not merely an academic exercise 
but a methodology that should be used by lawyers, insurers, and courts. It 
is an answer to the trappings of textualism that will produce more reliable 
and just coverage determinations than alternative interpretive approaches, 
in particular pure textualism. Its use will reduce the incidence of litigation 
in the medium to long run. Over time, the Integrative Approach will 
reduce the conflicting discrepancies that plague insurance coverage 
jurisprudence and propel unnecessary litigation.  
The Integrative Approach can accomplish these objectives using 
currently established interpretive tools anchored by a purposive initial 
inquiry which simply “peeks” at extra-contractual indicia as a guiding 
hand. Indeed, much of the evidence courts consider does not even run 
afoul of the parol evidence rule or constitute remotely novel categories of 
extrinsic evidence.  
III.  THE DISTORTION OF THE TEXTUALIST MIRAGE 
Several rationales are advanced in support of textualism.  However, all 
of these rationales are wanting, deceptive, or incorrect. One rationale, like 
the rationale for the statute of frauds, is that focusing on text is more likely 
to result in accurate contract determinations. Like textualism, this 
rationale falls short conceptually by treating the text of a memorialized 
agreement as the agreement itself. As stated by a leading contracts 
 
 63.  Because contract construction is a “matter of law,” courts tend to seek to decide contract 
construction cases on motion so long as there are not factual disputes about the content of the contract 
document (e.g., assertion of scrivener’s error, missing endorsement, fraud, mutual mistake).  Although 
this is fine in apt cases, overly textualist courts may be unduly resistant to recognizing that a full 
consideration of interpretative factors suggests the need for fact finding and determination, whether by 
jury or bench trial.  In apt cases, this is not a derogation of the prevailing rule that contract meaning is a 
matter of law but merely a realistic recognition that in some cases, the meaning and legal consequences 
of a transaction can only be assessed with the benefit of a fuller understanding of facts.   
 64.  And especially Thomas Drayage and its progeny, discussed at TAN 20-36, supra. 
 65.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS, supra note 4, §§ 200-229 (setting forth approach to 
contract interpretation).  The Integrative Approach also shares substantial kinship with more 
comprehensive approaches to statutory constructions urged by prominent legislation and legal process 
scholars.  See, e.g., HENRY HART JR. & ALBERT SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374-80 (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) 
(advocating approach to statutory interpretation that gives substantial consideration to purpose underlying 
statute and policies sought to be advanced as well as to the text of the law); William N. Eskridge Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) 
(advocating multi-faceted approach to construction of statutes that considers precedent, legislative history, 
statutory purpose, developments since enactment, and public values and norms as well as statutory text). 
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casebook: 
[T]he piece of paper is not a “contract.” . . . At most, the piece of paper is 
a memorialization of the contract . . .  [A] contract is a promise or set of 
promises that the law will enforce. 
 
* *     * 
 
[T]here is a tendency to confuse the written paper signed by the parties 
with the contract that binds them.  It is an easy mistake to make; everyone 
calls the signed paper “the contract.”  But that paper is, at best, only 
evidence of the contract.  That is, the contract is represented by that paper; 
it is not that paper.  Otherwise, if you tore the paper up (or spilled coffee 
on it) you would also tear up or water down the parties’ obligations.  While 
this may be the case with some types of obligations (such as checks or other 
negotiable instruments,), that is not the case with regular, everyday 
contracts.   
 
Where do we find the promises collectively recognized as the contract?  
There are many sources.  The most important, but not exclusive, source of 
contract terms is the words of the parties, be they written words or oral 
words.66 
This is the conceptually correct characterization.  The contract is not 
the text on paper, it is the deal, transaction, or objective memorialized on 
paper.67  Parties can easily make a ”scrivener’s error” and incorrectly 
memorialize an agreement.68  In such cases, strict textualism barring 
consideration of extrinsic evidence is ludicrous.  Contract law avoids this 
in part through doctrine permitting “reformation” of the memorialization 
(erroneously characterized as reformation of “the contract”)69 or the 
 
 66.  DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON CONTRACTS: MAKING AND DOING DEALS 12, 483-84 (4th ed. 2014).  We find this characterization 
additionally weighty not because it is the casebook used in author Stempel’s Contracts class but because 
the authors are not only prominent scholars and teachers but have substantial real world experience as law 
school deans, consultants, and expert witnesses and as a federal bankruptcy judge.   
 67.  To those who say that the writing (and not the agreement or undertaking) is the important 
thing, we say: “Fine.  But then why not jettison the contract model altogether and treat insurance policies 
entirely as products subject to minimum standards of product quality with an implied warranty of 
merchantability and express or implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose (e.g., general liability 
coverage, auto coverage).  Such an approach would be conceptually cleaner than fussing over fine print 
and probably would not unduly favor either policyholders or insurers.  See Stempel, The Insurance Policy 
as Thing, supra note 53.  But the same traditionalists who advocate word worship are unlikely to be willing 
to depart from the contract model.   
 68.  See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 7.5; PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 9.31-9.35.  
 69.  See FARNSWORTH supra note 4, § 7.5; PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 9.31-9.35.  See, e.g., Bd. of 
Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. 969 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1992)  (based on evidence of party 
intent, court reforms insurance policy with language court read as providing for $5 million per occurrence 
policy limits for annual period and four-month “stub” period into one providing $5 million limit for year 
and separate $5 million limit for occurrences taking place during stub period). 
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“absurd result” canon of construction.70  The corrective power of these 
doctrines is limited in the hands of a raging textualist judge, particularly 
one aggressively invoking the parol evidence rule.71  If the written 
memorialization is clear but inaccurate, it controls, which is silly.  Such 
blind textualism elevates an erroneous writing above the actual agreement 
or transaction.72  The objective of contract law is to enforce the promises 
actually made, not to enforce promises never made or different than made 
but contained in a writing.  By definition, a contract is the agreement 
made, not the memorialization of the agreement.73  But one might not 
understand this from reading the court opinions, which routinely refer to 
the memorialization as “the contract” without any distinction between 
agreement and written memorialization of the agreement.   
When an agreement does not result from full-throated bargaining and 
relies on a standardized form, as is the case with most consumer contracts 
and insurance policies, one can argue that what takes place is not so much 
an agreement confirmed by a writing but the purchase of contractual 
rights, with adherence to the terms of the form.  In these cases, the idea of 
“the contract” as text on paper may be more accurate.  Contracts involving 
an insurance policy, a lease, cellphone service, or a credit card account 
are often fait accompli contracts where the document is not so much a 
memorialization but a declaration of respective rights and duties.  In such 
cases, viewing the insurance policy as a consumer good or a factor sold 
 
 70.  See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, §§ 7.10; PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 3.10-3.13.  See, e.g., 
ExxonMobil Oil Corp. v. TIG Ins. Co., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87407 *28 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2020) 
(acknowledging absurd result principle but finding it inapplicable to insurer’s challenge to arbitration 
award in favor of policyholder); Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 768 N.W.2d 496, 504 (N.D. 2009) (applying 
absurd result principle to reject proffered construction of gas lease); Reno Club v. Young Inv. Co., 182 
P.2d 1011 (Nev. 1947) (contracts should not be construed so as to lead to an absurd result).  See also 
TIBCO Software, Inc. v. Thrive Revenue Sys., LLC, 2019 Del. Super. LEXIS 595 *15-16 (Del. Super. 
Ct., Nov. 21, 2019) (defining absurd result as “one that no reasonable person would have accepted when 
entering the contract”). 
 71.  See FARNSWORTH supra note 4, §§ 7.2-7.6; PERILLO, supra note 4, ch.3 at 119-21.   
  Properly understood, the parol evidence rule should not be a barrier to just results in which the 
contract is given a meaning consistent with that intended, the purpose of the transaction, or the goals and 
role of the transaction in the larger commercial or consumer context.  The proper view of the parol 
evidence rule is that it precludes consideration of prior agreements to vary the language of the contract 
document memorializing the actual, final agreement of the parties – provided the contract document is 
really the final agreement of the parties and was intended to be a fully integrated instrument containing 
all of the terms and conditions of the agreement.  Consequently, background information regarding the 
parties, their relationship, the purpose of the transaction, the industry in question, and other contextual 
factors should not be barred by the parole evidence rule.  See FARNSWORTH supra note 2, § 7.3; PERILLO, 
supra note 2, at §§ 3.2-3.4; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS,  supra note 4 § 213. 
 72.  We continue to frequently use the term “agreement or transaction” because in many cases, a 
party contracts without really “agreeing” to any particular contract terms – and may even dislike the terms 
of the written document – but is voluntarily engaging in the transaction memorialized in the written 
contract documents. 
 73.  See note 67, supra. 
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to a business makes more sense than continuing to cleave to the contract 
model.  
But the product-like traits of an insurance policy does not make myopic 
examination of text (rather than a broader, more contextual approach) any 
more just.  It does, however, support utilization of a strong form of the 
reasonable expectations approach or judicial willingness to assess 
contract meaning by noting the similarity of contracts to products, private 
legislation, or the activities of a regulated industry.  This is particularly 
the case with insurance.  But despite these considerations, courts continue 
to embrace a narrow textualism while failing to utilize these other 
conduits of meaning. 
If the written “contract document” (a technically more accurate term 
than “contract”) is one where most of the contents were never discussed 
by the parties, it would seem more apt to treat such transactions like the 
sale of a product or give preference to the objectively reasonable 
expectations of the parties when construing such instruments.  However, 
the same courts that cling so tenaciously to the inaccurate textual model 
are resistant to the more representative product and reasonable 
expectations models. 
The accuracy justification for textualism is more of an anti-fraud 
justification, positing that consideration of information other than the text 
of the contract document opens the door to fabrication and deception as 
well as more benign error.  The argument is that memories fade or become 
distorted. Therefore, a court should rely on text alone to the extent 
possible rather than extrinsic evidence of intent or purpose.  Related is the 
argument that an unscrupulous or opportunistic party, or one with buyer’s 
remorse, may simply fabricate a side agreement or understanding not 
found in the text of the instrument.74 
Though these arguments are not meritless, they are not persuasive—
particularly so 400 years after the statute of frauds was enacted in 
England75 and 150 years after the parol evidence rule took root in the 
United States.76 Prior to the mid-twentieth century, sources of recollection 
and verification were limited. However, since the development of 
photocopies, phone and wire records, and electronic data, the quantity of 
memorialized extrinsic evidence has exploded.  This explosion serves as 
a check on faulty memory and forgetfulness and makes fabrication much 
harder. This type of recorded information provides a more accurate 
depiction of the intent, purpose, and function of the contract than merely 
the contract itself. 
Further, the purported accuracy rationale for strict textualism rests on 
 
 74.  See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, at § 7.2; PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 3.1, 3.2.   
 75.  See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 6.1; PERILLO, supra note 4, at 677-81.   
 76.  See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, at § 7.2; PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 3.1, 3.11-3.14. 
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a shaky premise of institutional competence. The rationale posits that 
judges are exceedingly skilled at construing language but suspect in their 
ability to assess information regarding the background, intent, purpose, 
and context of an agreement. As one scholar put it, “judges are not 
investigative reporters.”77  Justice William Brennan similarly asserted the 
historical prong of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial analysis 
should be retired because judges were not trained historians.78  
But these criticisms of judicial competence regarding investigation and 
historical analysis fail to appreciate that judges are neither linguists nor 
trained in hermeneutics.  While judges may have had competent English 
teachers in high school, discovered Strunk & White79 during college or 
law school, and subscribe to Bryan Garner’s “word of the day” emails,80 
they typically lack training in word meaning or language use.81 Judges 
also commonly lack formal training in psychology beyond the 
introductory courses of undergraduate days.82   
Despite all their perceived deficiencies, judges make inferences about 
what contract draftspersons, legislative staff, and ISO83 personnel are 
thinking when selecting policy language and drafting contracts and 
statutes. The canons of construction—at least those regarding word 
meaning—implicitly adopt an external view of the intent behind certain 
language.84  These assumptions may be totally inaccurate if the drafting 
is done by someone with a different educational, vocational, or 
professional background.85  The assumptions may have been inaccurate 
 
 77.  Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: 
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 239 (1986) (“Judges interpret statutes; they are not 
investigative reporters.  The idea that Congress passes statues “with a wink,” and that courts should dig 
behind the scenes to find out the “real story,” is both unwarranted and dangerous.”). 
 78.  Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 533 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 79.  WILLIAM STRUNK & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE (4th ed. 1999). 
 80.  University of Texas law professor and linguistic entrepreneur Bryan Garner issues daily 
emails addressing questions of word meaning and language use.  See, e.g., Bryan Garner’s Usage Tip: 
launch (April 20, 2018), available at www.lawprose.org. 
 81.  See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993); Jill C. Anderson, Misreading 
Like a Lawyer, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (2014); Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics, The Lost Readings of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992 (2008).   
 82.  See JEAN STERNLIGHT & JENNIFER ROBBENOLT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS (2012).   
 83.  ISO is the Insurance Services Office, an organization supporting the insurance industry 
through data collection and promulgation of insurance forms and endorsements for property and casualty 
insurers. 
 84.  See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 61, Appendix B, (identifying canons of word meaning and 
canons reflecting substantive policy). 
 85.  Although it may be a useful legal fiction to assume that every insurance policy or other 
contract document is written by people who received the same English grammar instruction and reacted 
to it in the same way, this is unrealistic to the point of absurdity.  Some drafters were drilled with 
traditional rules and diagrammed sentences.  Others attended open schools where rules of grammar (and 
perhaps rules generally) were not emphasized.  And drafters vary in terms of whether they adhere to rules 
or rebel against them.  If George Bernard Shaw or James Joyce writes the statute, one might take a different 
25
Stempel and Knutsen: Rejecting Word Worship
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications,
586 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90 
even as applied to the educated professionals viewed as the typical 
drafters of contracts or statutes. 
In short, although judges may be more sophisticated than the average 
person, they are not experts in hermeneutics.  The same may be said about 
a judge’s knowledge of politics, sociology, economics, statistics, 
business, or other industries involved in the cases, contracts, and statutes 
before judges.  And yet the picture painted by textualists is that judges are 
masters in deciphering language but clueless about the history, 
psychology, sociology, public policy, or nature of the transactions 
involved in the statutes and contracts before the courts.86 
Poppycock.  The average judge is likely to understand manufacturing, 
retailing, sports, entertainment, investment, or construction at least as 
well as she understands the linguistic meaning of the text used in contract 
documents involving these activities.  Further, in the American adversary 
system, one can reasonably expect that counsel for the litigants will 
provide ample contextual information to the court, just as advocates 
provide information and argument as to word meaning.  There is no 
reason to think that judges are more accurate at reading text than 
understanding the extrinsic evidence of a dispute.  The textualist narrative 
 
approach to its text than if it is written by a career bureaucrat.   
  Further, cheap shots at bureaucracy aside, there may be specific protocols governing particular 
drafters.  For example, in the recently infamous “Oxford comma” case, the court was aware that the State 
of Maine’s drafting manual for staff followed a style in which there was not a final (“serial” or “English” 
or “Oxford”) comma before the conjunction and final term in a series of terms.  In spite of this, the court 
took a highly textualist approach and regarded the absence of the comma as significant enough to combine 
rather than separate two categories in a list.  See O’Connor v. Oakhurst Dairy, 851 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2017).  
The court’s hyper-textual focus appears to be clearly at odds with the intended purpose and operation of 
the statute, which was amended to constructively overrule the Oakhurst Dairy result. 
 86.   Economics has been the most successful extra-textual discipline to impact adjudication.  See 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (4th ed. 2011); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & 
ECONOMICS (5th ed. 2008).  But even here, the impact is largely tacit rather than expressly based on 
economic analysis.  But see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (Court 
finds predatory pricing so unlikely as a matter of economic theory that it insists on direct evidence of 
conspiracy if summary judgment is to be avoided.  As much as we advocate judicial consideration of 
material other than documentary text, we acknowledge that Matsushita’s excessively credulous embrace 
of a particular brand of economic theory as a matter of law may make a strong case for limiting judicial 
resort to social science theory.  See Michael J. Kaufman,  Summary Pre-Judgment: The Supreme Court’s 
Profound, Pervasive, and Problematic Presumption about Human Behavior, 43 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 592 
(2012)) (withering criticism of Matsushita, attributing considerable ensuing doctrinal damage from the 
decision); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror:  The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary 
Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988) (criticizing 
Matsushita but viewing its impact as more limited and isolated).   
  Our response is simply to note that mistakes will be made when pursuing even the most 
valuable of methodologies.  A court taking the integrative and comprehensive approach to contract 
meaning can still make mistakes.  We believe, however, that over sufficient time with a sufficiently large 
number of cases, courts will render better interpretative opinions if they regularly consider a broad range 
of interpretative factors in addition to text.   
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posits that judges have the linguistic skill of Harold Bloom87 but process 
contextual evidence about as well as a fourth grader. 
Another frequently advanced rationale for textualism is that a focus on 
text constrains courts from rendering decisions based on personal policy 
preferences.88  However, this rationale incorrectly assumes that neutral 
readers of the text of a contract document can readily agree on its 
meaning.  It assumes a false clarity of language that has been refuted by 
research and ignores the well-established vulnerability of humans to false 
consensus bias—the view that others interpret a writing the same way as 
the reader—when, in actuality, there is often substantial variance and 
difference of opinion.89  Though this trait may be reduced or even 
controlled in the deliberative setting of appellate review, a single trial 
judge’s reading of a contract document is highly vulnerable to this trait.  
Fewer than half of a trial judge’s dispositive decisions are appealed,90 
which likely stems from the high cost of appeal at least as much as any 
substantive acceptance of the trial judge’s rulings.91 
Also, the view that text constrains the results-oriented “activist” judge 
suffers from both a lack of clarity as to what constitutes impermissible 
result-orientation and naivety as to the potential for a result-oriented judge 
to flourish under a text-centric system. The judge wishing to advance 
personal policy preferences without regard to what the parties actually 
intended can easily do so by advancing an interpretation of text designed 
to achieve that result.  By contrast, forcing this same result-oriented judge 
to address the context of the contract does more to restrain such a judge. 
A third rationale posits that confining the judicial inquiry92 to text 
 
 87.  Harold Bloom, Sterling Professor of Humanities at Yale University, is considered a leading 
scholar of literature and literary critic who is perhaps best known to the general public for THE WESTERN 
CANON: THE BOOKS AND SCHOOL OF THE AGES (1994) and THE BOOK OF J (2004).  See also HOW TO 
READ AND WHY (2000).  See James Shapiro, The Soul of the Age, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 1998), 
https://perma.cc/6PVW-MFKF (Bloom is “one of the most gifted of contemporary critics”). 
 88.  See e.g., Paul Killebrew, Note, Where Are All the Left-Wing Textualists?, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1895, 1918 (2007) (“By making judges stick to statutory text and refrain from making unbounded 
inquiries into legislative intent, textualism gives judges fewer materials on which to base interpretations 
chosen primarily because they further the judges' own preferred outcomes.”). 
 89.  See Lawrence Solan, False Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM L. REV. 
1268 (2008). 
 90.  See Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further 
Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Outcomes, 1 J. EMP. LEG. STUDIES 659 (2004) (appeals filed in only 10-20 
percent of cases, with appeal rate of less than 40 percent in cases with full trial). 
 91.  See Donna Bader, An Appeal to Reason (2011), advertised at 
https://www.anappealtoreason.com/faq (cost of appeal ranges from $20,000 to $50,000); Sylvia H. 
Walbolt, The Art of Evaluating an Appeal: 10 Hard-Learned Tips, Carlton Fields (Aug. 23, 2016), 
https://www.carletonfields.com (prominent appellate lawyer notes that although appeals can be effective 
in changing adverse result or providing settlement leverage, they are also often costly and appellant is at 
a disadvantage in challenging trial court result). 
 92.   See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
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conserves judicial resources and enhances judicial efficiency. This 
rationale appears  the most accurate of the three. Logically, at least, it 
seems that a court can resolve contract disputes faster if it is required only 
to read and interpret text rather than to consider extrinsic evidence that 
emerges only after the court has presided over the resolution of discovery 
disputes. 
But this argument overstates the time savings of a relentlessly textual 
approach.  Unless obviously clear and apt for the circumstances, some 
nontrivial judicial resources will be required to read, understand, and 
reflect upon the language of statutes and contract documents and assess 
the arguments of counsel. By looking at text alone and purporting to 
understand it, the court will be tempted to resolve the interpretative 
dispute as a matter of law via a motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment. This approach likely leads to appeal and reversal more 
frequently than a summary judgment decision as to meaning supported by 
extrinsic evidence.  To the extent that extrinsic evidence shows a genuine 
issue of material fact precluding summary judgment, the case marches 
toward trial, probably to be settled without the expenditure of 
substantially more judicial resources. 
In short, textualism does not save courts much time.  Any time saved 
is likely at the cost of accuracy and justice.  If judicial decisions as to the 
meaning of a writing are made with the benefit of additional information 
regarding meaning, those decisions are likely to be more accurate than 
decisions based on text alone.  Even if this accuracy comes at significant 
administrative cost, it is a trade-off worth making.  Reduced accuracy of 
contract construction decisions resulting from the rigid application of 
textualism should be acceptable only if limiting the inquiry to text saves 
vast amounts of judicial and legal resources. However, there is 
insufficient evidence of such efficiency to justify use of the limited, 
contextually impoverished inquiry of textualism, rather than the richer 
examination of the Integrative Approach. 
A fourth rationale for textualism posits that it is an interpretative 
approach better suited to the limited authority of courts. The argument 
runs something like this: courts should avoid intruding on the other 
branches of government and agreements of private parties; when asked to 
 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 36 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("The most immediate and tangible change 
the abandonment of legislative history would effect is this: Judges, lawyers, and clients will be saved an 
enormous amount of time and expense.").; James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from 
Judges Interpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L. J. 1, 83 (1994) ("At bottom, one practical 
advantage of textualism is its comparative ease of application with little investment of judicial and litigant 
resources. Cases can be decided without extensive investigation of legislative histories or discussion of 
competing policy implications, tasks judges and litigants in the lower courts may find difficult to 
undertake.").  Even strong supporters of textualism concede that this cannot be done in each case because 
of ambiguity of text.  We are not trying to cartoon textualism.   
28
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/5
2021] REJECTING WORD WORSHIP 589 
construe a statute or contract, courts should limit their activity to classic 
judicial activity, such as reading and construing contract text, and avoid 
activity that could be construed as “rewriting” a contract or “legislating 
from the bench.”93 
This argument and rationale rests on an infirm foundation.  Although 
courts lack legislative and executive policymaking authority, legal rulings 
ultimately have policy implications. Even in the private law realm of 
contract, it has long been accepted that courts will not enforce illegal 
contracts, contracts made by minors, unconscionable contracts, or 
contracts that violate public policy.  Thus, there is nothing “wrong” with 
courts making decisions based on public policy factors.   
More importantly, like the adjudication of negligence claims, the 
resolution of contract disputes is a core judicial function.  Contract dispute 
resolution by reference to material other than the text of contract 
documents does not offend other branches of government.  In the realm 
of statutory interpretation, consideration of legislative history, executive 
orders, and presidential signing statements, there is more judicial 
deference to the coordinate branches than reliance on statutory text alone.  
The “judicial restraint” argument of strict textualism is just as weak as the 
other rationales discussed.  
IV.  COURTS AS HELPFUL AGENTS RATHER THAN LIMITED UMPIRES 
The umpire metaphor of judging has a dominant place in American 
thinking about the judicial process, as perhaps most famously illustrated 
through its use by Chief Justice John Roberts to support his nomination.  
Justice Roberts successfully allayed concerns that his apparent history of 
conservative ideology and past political activity was inconsistent with the 
judiciary as comprised of judges functioning as mere neutral umpires who 
simply “call balls and strikes” without partisanship.94 Although several 
commentators, correctly in our view, including Judge Richard Posner, 
pointed out flaws in the metaphor,95 it resonated well with the lay public 
 
 93.  See sources cited in note 88, supra (arguing that textualism curbs judicial activism). 
 94.  See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of 
the United States: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief J. of the United States) (“Judges 
are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is 
critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball 
game to see the umpire.”);  MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS 
COURT ix (2013) (noting success of Roberts umpire metaphor but finding it to mask Court with active 
conservative agenda).  And Justice Roberts was hardly the first to invoke the umpire metaphor, although 
he may be the poster child of its success.  See Symposium, Alternative Visions of the Judicial Role  32 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 511(2009). 
 95.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 78 (2010) (criticizing umpire metaphor as both 
simplistic and affirmatively misleading). 
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and the body politic.96 
To the extent that the umpire metaphor simply stands for the 
proposition that judges should not be biased for or prejudiced against the 
individual litigants or those clearly impacted by a decision, we have no 
quarrel with it. An umpire who takes a bribe, bets against the point spread, 
or even secretly has favorites or roots for one team is not a proper 
adjudicator. But even if not personally invested in the game, umpires 
differ regarding their views of the strike zone, reasonable time to allow a 
pitcher’s set-up, out and safe calls at first base, what constitutes 
interference with a base runner, and the like. 
Differential exercise of discretion abounds not only in the umpire 
analogy but throughout officiating.  A football referee could call holding, 
illegal use of the hands or pass interference on nearly every play but does 
not.  Basketball referees vary in the amount of body contact permitted 
under the basket, but “calling it close” could turn a game into a constant 
parade between the foul lines. Hockey officials display discretion in 
determining when a scrum for the puck in the corner becomes a boarding 
or cross-checking penalty.  Just as some officials are known to call it close 
while others “let them play,” judges vary in their approach to text.   
To determine the relative merits of a strictly textual approach versus a 
broader approach to contract and statutory construction, one question to 
ask is whether strict textualism leads to more or less variance of 
interpretation compared to when judges consider text along with other 
indicia of meaning.  More important still is the question of whether 
construction confined to text gives more or less accurate assessments than 
a broader approach.  Also obviously important is the question of whether 
decisions rendered pursuant to a strictly textual examination yield more 
just outcomes than decisions made using a broader approach.97 
Like the umpire analogy, a focus on text or even text alone is thought 
to constrain the judge from interjecting the court’s own opinions, based 
on the view that language is almost always clear and can only be stretched 
so far when the interpreter is both confined to text and also unable to 
consider information beyond the text.98  But this view is incorrect and not 
only ignores the great flexibility interpreters have regarding reading of 
text (similar to that of umpires and other officials) but also unduly 
 
 96.  John Roberts was confirmed as Chief Justice by a 78-22 vote on September 29, 2005.  His 
performance at his confirmation hearings was generally praised in the media.  See Charles Babington & 
Peter Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Justice, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2005), 
https://perma.cc/7ANM-EHTN  (Roberts “drew rave reviews from many senators for his encyclopedic 
knowledge of constitutional law and his smooth answers during two days of Senate hearings”). 
 97.  Although some may view this inquiry as less important of a view that courts are primarily 
dispute resolvers and only secondarily articulators of norms. 
 98.  See sources cited in note 88, supra (supporting textualism as cabining judicial discretion/more 
consistent with judicial role). 
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minimizes the constraints adjudicators face when viewing information 
extrinsic to text. 
Particularly important, and seemingly overlooked by advocates of the 
traditional umpire analogy, is the degree to which officiating discretion is 
exercised not in a textualist vacuum, such as what “the rule” says, but in 
a contextual manner. The “rule” contained in the text of the rulebook is 
that basketball is a non-contact sport, but in the area near the basket, 
players are always jostling for position, just as they are constantly setting 
screens.  Referees may or may not let roughhousing go without penalty 
depending not only on the extremity but also the effect of the conduct.  
Pushing or grabbing the opponent when play is at the other end of the 
floor goes uncalled, while the same conduct when the opponent is 
attempting to receive a pass or tap in a rebound results in a foul call.  A 
slap on the shooter’s forearm when launching a shot is called a foul in the 
middle of the second half in a close game.  It goes uncalled in the last 
minute of a blowout. 
Sports referees, like laypersons, instinctively use a broad, contextual 
approach to interpretation of text and application of rules.  And insofar as 
we have been able to discover, nothing is said about this in the text of the 
rulebooks.99  It is part of the “common sense” that law is supposed to 
celebrate but that somehow has been shunted aside by textual 
fundamentalists.  The judiciary should openly harness the same common 
sense in matters of interpretation and formally disavow the excessively 
textualist interpretation. Courts already do this to a large extent even when 
purporting to be confined to the text of a contract document.100 
 
 99.  For example, the 66-page Rulebook of the National Basketball Association says nothing about 
whether officials are supposed to enforce the rules formally or functionally and says nothing about the 
degree of discretion, if any, official have in applying the Rules.  See NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N, OFFICIAL 
RULES OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION (2016) (the most updated version of the Rulebook 
is available at https://official.nba.com); NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N, NBA CASE BOOK 2016-
2017: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS TO NBA RULES (2016) (setting forth many hypothetical situations and 
providing model answers as to characterization as foul and enforcement).  
  One could read the Rules in isolation and conclude that officials should call every single 
violation seen, no matter how slight.  However, Section IV (“Decisions by Different Officials,” dealing 
with conferences regarding different views of a foul or out-of-bounds call) and Section V (“Time and 
Place for Decisions,” setting forth protocol for communicating decisions and allowing officials to 
“suspend play for any unusual circumstance” suggests some level of discretion for the official.  Referees 
are implicitly authorized to use their discretion, but the scope of the discretion and its application are part 
of the context and “common law” of the League.  
  The rulebooks of other major sports are similarly vague as to how official should apply the 
Rules.  See, e.g., NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE, NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE OFFICIAL RULES 2017-
2018 (2017), http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/rules/2017-2018-NHL-rulebook.pdf  (no discussion of 
referee discretion or protocols of enforcement), NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 2017 OFFICIAL PLAYING 
RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE (2017), https://operations.nfl.com/media/2646/2017-
playing-rules.pdf (most updated version available at nfl.com). 
 100.  See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 51, § 3 cmt. b  (noting 
that even courts embracing a strict plain-meaning textual approach often do look outside the insurance 
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We are not advocating total eradication of the umpire metaphor.  
Notwithstanding its flaws, it captures more than a kernel of the judicial 
role.  Similarly, consideration of text is, of course, a core element of the 
interpretative role of the judiciary.  However, just as the umpire metaphor 
should not be simplistically and inflexibly imposed on the nuanced 
activity of adjudication, the courts should similarly not view text only in 
isolation. At a minimum, courts should not be overly literal when reading 
text.   
Rather than worrying about limitations on judicial role and the dangers 
of interpretation that enlists material other than documentary text, courts 
would be more helpful to disputants, the judicial system, the economy, 
society, and the business of insurance, if they openly embraced the role 
of helpful arbiters of disputes willing to examine all potential indicators 
of meaning. 
The judicial role should be one of seeking to determine the actual 
meaning of a disputed term in light of all relevant factors, in a manner 
that vindicates the intent of the parties, the purpose of the contract, the 
function of the transaction, and where not inconsistent with these other 
factors, public policy.  In short, courts should worry less about the precise 
meaning of textual memorialization of a transaction and worry more 
about giving contract document text a construction that fairly resolves the 
dispute. 
The Integrative Approach is perhaps both radical and pedestrian.  It is 
radical in that it challenges, or perhaps rejects altogether, conventional 
wisdoms regarding the supposedly constrained umpire role and the clarity 
and constraining power of text.  But it is pedestrian in that many courts 
already take something akin to the Integrative Approach.  However, 
courts that take the Integrative Approach often do so under cover of 
distinctly unhelpful textualist rhetoric.   
The Integrative Approach, at the risk of being pedestrian, simply 
implores courts to be helpful and useful, to lend a hand in the purposive 
enterprise of accomplishing a transaction, rather than acting as formalist 
gatekeepers who deny purchased contract benefits or award windfalls 
based on a reading of words in isolation.  Courts should also obviously 
attempt to be helpful to private parties and other governmental actors.  
And most judges, even the most formalist or textualist, would 
undoubtedly argue that this is what they do, justifying their judicial 
philosophy in terms similar to the rationales used to support rigid 
 
policy for evidence of meaning, examining dictionaries, decisions from other courts, and secondary legal 
authority that provides information about the history and context of insurance-policy forms and insurance 
practices.).   
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application of the statute of limitations,101 res judicata,102 an arbitration 
provision included with the packing material of a computer,103 a definition 
of protected species,104 calculation of statutory compensation,105 or 
refusal to uphold a seeming agreement because it is not sufficiently 
specific on the face of the contract documents.106  In the insurance context, 
this judicial textual formalism is reflected in cases giving strict 
application to a policy’s text, such as imposing strict deadlines for giving 
notice, submitting claims, defining causation, and the like.107 
To this segment of the bench, being helpful means rigidly applying the 
rules and what is seen as the clear meaning of text.  There is ample judicial 
rhetoric supporting their textual literalism.  Ironically, however, even as 
textualist rhetoric abounds, some of the most revered judges are those 
 
 101.  See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, (1985) (giving literal and strict enforcement to 
provision requiring renewal of lease “before December 31” under circumstances strongly suggesting 
language resulting from scrivener’s error and that intent was to state “on or before December 31,” resulting 
in forfeiture of rights).   
 102.  See, e.g. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (talking strict view of claim 
preclusion/res judicata). 
 103.  See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), (arbitration clause contained 
in package slip inside box of delivered computer is enforceable and accepted by purchaser’s continued 
use of computer after unpacking even though arbitration was never discussed as part of the sale); M.A. 
Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (same approach enforcing 
arbitration clause in software disk “shrinkwrap”).  Accord, Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Telegraph Co., 701 
F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2012) (applying Florida and Oklahoma law) (enforcing forum selection provisions 
contained in “clickwrap” to which customer ostensibly assents via internet; reviewing caselaw generally 
enforcing such provisions in accord with their text).  Further reflecting the perils of textualism the Hill v. 
Gateway reading of the text of the package “terms in a box” is regarded by many as incorrect.  See, e.g., 
Klocek v. Gateway, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, n. 9 (D. Kan. 2000) (subsequently vacated for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction) (noting scholarly criticism of Hill v. Gateway analysis and rejecting it in favor of view 
that arbitration agreement was not made simply because portion of contract shipping documents contained 
arbitration clause).  
 104.  See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (construing Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 
U.S.C. 1531 to protect the snail darter and preclude operation of dam that would disturb its last remaining 
natural habitat). 
 105.  See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982) (taking literal view of 
Jones Act remedies provision to provide plaintiff seaman with double wages for each day payment of 
“full” wage was delayed, 46 U.S.C. § 4529, resulting in $302,000 award where defendant had wrongfully 
retained $412.50 of wages from period of January 1, 1976, when plaintiff was injured until time of trial 
years later).  To be fair to Justice Rehnquist and the Griffin majority, they did consider legislative history, 
including amendments to the statute, that was enacted in 1790.  But see 458 U.S. at 577 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (taking issue with majority’s reading of legislative history as well as strict textualism). 
 106.  See, e.g., Walker v. Keith, 382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964) (finding lease term too indefinite 
because a specific option price for renewal not stated; court unwilling to determine reasonable price by 
reference to custom, practice, or other extrinsic or contextual information). 
 107.  See, e.g., Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Acker-Fitzsimons Sec. Corp., 293 N.E.2d 76 (N.Y. 1972) 
(giving strict enforcement of  requirement that notice be timely even in the absence of any showing of 
prejudice to the insurer); Kirk v. Fin. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 389 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. 1978) (enforcing provision 
requiring that limb be amputated within 90 days to be considered caused by accident and eligible for 
enhanced benefits.).  More recently, see Keyspan Gas E. Corp. v. Munich Reins. Am., Inc., 96 N.E.3d 
209 (N.Y. 2018) (requiring pro-rata allocation of coverage responsibility across years during which injury 
took place even if policyholder was unable to obtain insurance during certain years). 
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rejecting literalism.108 As compared to the prevailing formal or textual 
approaches, the role of the judge as the helpful purveyor of purposive 
information, based on the consideration of multiple factors, has been 
unduly overlooked because it might wrongly be labeled partisan judicial 
activism and, in regard to statutory construction, out of a misplaced view 
of the role of courts as a check on other branches of government.  
Applied to the construction of insurance policies, the helpful judicial 
role means courts not only reading policy text realistically but also 
reading language in context, considering other indicia of meaning, even 
when the isolated text is seemingly clear on its face.  Text standing alone 
can be misleading without context.  Reasonable readers may derive quite 
different meanings from the same text.  Further, text is only the contract 
document and not the contract. The court’s preferred reading of text 
should always be weighed against these other considerations.  The judicial 
role should not be to serve as a grammar arbiter or literary critic but to 
decide disputes of interpretation as accurately as feasible based on 
available information.  
Although advocating any deviation from textualism seems to draw 
criticism, the Integrative Approach should also be unobjectionable in that 
it will probably not alter the results obtained by textualism in many, 
perhaps most, cases. A judge’s interpretation of the text will usually be 
vindicated rather than changed by examination of other interpretative 
factors. Although text is imperfect and textualism opens itself to 
manipulation far more than its defenders admit, we acknowledge that 
most contract documents accurately reflect the understanding of the 
parties and aim of the transaction at issue. 
This raises the question of whether the additional time considering 
extrinsic evidence is worth the effort. To us, the clear answer is “yes.”  
Achieving optimal, accurate, and just construction of text is worth the 
extra effort and cost, unless the cost is shown to be sufficiently high to 
imperil other goals of the adjudicatory system.   
Proponents of textualism can undoubtedly trot out testimonials—
perhaps even from judges themselves—about the burdens and costs of 
processing extrinsic evidence. But this is insufficient support for 
textualism, particularly where the testimonials are anecdotal rather than 
based on a sufficiently large empirical examination of whether textualism 
actually achieves its purported benefits.     
 
 108.  See, e.g., Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921) (Judge Benjamin Cardozo 
rejects view that specification of a particular brand of pipe must be literally enforced so as to require 
replacing plumbing system in custom-build home); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 
(N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo implies term not on the face of written instrument to find agreement sufficiently 
definite to merit enforcement).  See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 
(1990) (noting great esteem in which Cardozo is held by lawyers and attributing much of it to his 
pragmatist approach to deciding cases, which considered a range of contextual factors). 
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The incremental cost of considering the relatively small relevant 
amount of extrinsic contextual information surrounding a written 
instrument is not particularly large when added to the base cost of 
adjudicating the dispute in the first place.  In an adversary system, the 
judge does not need to engage in extensive research and sweeping 
consideration of vast fields of contextual evidence to decide a dispute.  
Counsel for the parties should frame both the textual and contextual 
aspects of the case and develop extrinsic information relevant to the 
dispute.   
Absent a great imbalance of resources or incompetent counsel, the 
adversary system should provide the neutral judge with a database of 
information to accompany the textual term in dispute.  Our view is that 
this greater quantum of information will not be that expensive to 
develop,109 and its consideration by courts will improve the adjudicatory 
interpretative process. 
Although fans of textualism, including many judges, can be expected 
to complain about the burden of “sifting through” extrinsic information, 
we think such protests are excessive.  Unlike their civil law counterparts, 
American judges are not burdened by the inquisitorial model of 
developing a case.  They can, thanks in part to the umpire metaphor, wait 
to see what the advocates working in an adversarial system put before 
them in terms of highlighted contract document text, correspondence, 
meeting minutes, drafting history, custom, practice, usage in trade, course 
of dealing, or expert information regarding an industry or field.   
The list of considerations under our Integrative Approach looks 
daunting in general but in specific cases will be much shorter according 
to the facts of the dispute.  Effective counsel, particularly if challenging 
an opponent’s reading of documentary text to which the court may be 
receptive, do not throw the proverbial kitchen sink of extrinsic 
information at the judge. Rather, counsel selects the most relevant 
information with which he or she hopes to persuade the court that his or 
her proffered meaning is the correct construction of the disputed text.  
Opposing counsel responds in kind.   
If the adversary system is working as it should, the parties and counsel 
have done the sifting for the court.  The judge need only review this 
streamlined material alongside the text and make a decision.  This does 
not strike us as an undue burden waiting for ‘something’ to happen; this 
strikes us as likely to bring more just results than staring at the text 
alone.110  
 
 109.  In practice, this contextual information may be being developed and presented in the majority 
of contract construction cases but simply go unnoticed because it is not openly discussed by courts 
interpreting disputed text in insurance policies or other contract documents. 
 110.  At the margin, a more comprehensive approach will result in some cases in which there is at 
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V.  DE-EMPHASIZING THE DICTIONARY 
If strict textualism allows any sort of extrinsic evidence beyond the text 
to deduce meaning of contract terms at issue, a small nudge will typically 
prompt most strict textualists to permit consideration of one singular 
extrinsic source of word meaning: the dictionary. The dictionary is 
ubiquitous in insurance coverage interpretation disputes. For some 
reason, using a dictionary to consider insurance policy word meaning is 
seen as less heretic a move than considering the underwriting evidence 
from the employee who drafted the insurance policy. This, to us, is a 
puzzle.  
While our Integrative Approach does not revolt entirely from using a 
dictionary to assist in the interpretive analysis, there should be a very 
limited and conscribed use for the dictionary in legal construction 
instances. The dictionary is merely one indicia of possible word meaning 
in a contract and one entirely unrelated to the actual drafting process.  
 Indeed, on the continuum of what could be “extrinsic” evidence, such 
as evidence beyond the four corners of the document, the dictionary is 
more “extrinsic” than a host of other extrinsic evidence, like past 
performance, course of dealing, trade usage, contemporaneous notes, oral 
evidence of the negotiation, or even third-party witnesses to the 
negotiation. In fact, the dictionary might be about as “extrinsic” as one 
can get. No insurance policy has stapled to it a standard college 
dictionary—the policy does not direct one to consult a dictionary for any 
additional information—yet the high church of textualism reveres the 
dictionary.111 
There are serious interpretive dangers to using solely a dictionary to 
construe word meaning in a contractual dispute. Judge Learned Hand’s 
observation about not making a “fortress out of the dictionary”112 was 
 
least a marginal uptick in the material that must be considered by courts and hence create somewhat more 
work for courts.  But unless it can be shown that the extra work is unduly burdensome, it should be 
regarded as worthwhile in order to achieve better results.  It must also be noted, as stated in RLLI § 3, 
comment a. that even courts purporting to be strictly textualist routinely do take on the burden of analyzing 
“dictionaries, decisions form other courts, and secondary legal authority that provides information about 
the history and context of insurance-policy forms and insurance practice.”  See RLLI, supra note 42, at 
18.  In most cases, this takes at least as much or more time and effort as the consideration of other indicia 
of meaning advocated by the Integrative Approach. 
 111.  See Mark A. Lemley, Chief Justice Webster, 106 IOWA L. REV. 299, 299 (“The Supreme Court 
has a love affair with the dictionary.   Half of its decisions in the 2018 Term cited a dictionary, often as 
the primary or exclusive means of defining a statutory term.  The Court regularly upends decades of 
precedent and ignores congressional intent (and sometimes common sense) in favor of a chosen dictionary 
definition.”). 
 112.  See Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (“It is one of the surest indexes of 
a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary but to remember that 
statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery 
is the surest guide to their meaning.”).    
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excellent advice seventy-five years ago and remains so today, albeit 
unfortunately forgotten by many modern courts and commentators.113 The 
fact that dictionary usage has been settled upon as some sort of 
compromised middle ground for textualists is downright spooky. 
It may be that looking up the meaning of a disputed word in a dictionary 
is seen as a neutral, policy-free action that could not possibly taint the 
purely textual inquiry into the “plain meaning” of a disputed term. It is 
not. It cannot be. The dictionary, as an extra-legal text, is a resource for 
something other than what it is being used for in that context. The 
dictionary is not a legal treatise. It is not referred to in insurance policies. 
It is a separate historical encyclopedia of past and present possible 
meanings for individual words. Each entry can have many possible 
meanings. Each version of the dictionary, whether Oxford or Merriam-
Webster, can have different meanings.114 There are many examples in 
insurance law where a single term at issue can have multiple possible 
meanings cited in dictionaries, some favouring a coverage result, and 
others not. 
Furthermore, the order in which words appear in the dictionary may 
not be what the court expects. Typically, words are defined in a dictionary 
from earliest use to most recent use.115 The order is not from most to least 
popular use. There is also something highly problematic about parsing out 
individual words in an insurance policy and looking up each word 
separately from the other, devoid of any basic context, including how each 
word is placed related to the other in the policy. A disambiguated meaning 
of a word, or words strung together, is just that. It is an extra-legal, extra-
contractual descriptor of a single word. How that word operates in the 
phrase it sits, or in the document, may have a profound effect on what it 
means. Whether the word sits in a coverage or exclusion clause is the most 
obvious example. Coverage clauses in insurance are to be construed 
 
 113.  The shocking frequency of the modern Supreme Court’s dictionary use is well encapsulated 
in Adam Liptak, Justices Turning More Frequently to Dictionary, and Not Just for Big Words, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 13, 2011) (noting 10-fold upsurge in dictionary consultation in 21st Century Court as compared to 
1960s Court and that “Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Benjamin N. Cardozo and Louis D. Brandeis 
managed to make it through distinguished careers on the Supreme Court without citing dictionaries.”).  
Further, “The justices cited more than 120 dictionaries, which is suggestive of cherry picking.”  Id.    Not 
even the editor of the Oxford English Dictionary was happy about the Court’s affinity for dictionaries, 
noting: “It’s easy to stack the deck by finding a definition that does or does not highlight a nuance that 
you’re interested in” and “[d]ictionary definitions are written with a lot of things in mind, but rigorously 
circumscribing the exact meaning and connotations of terms is not usually one of them” (comments of 
Jesse Sheidlower).  Id. 
 114.  See, e.g., the varying definitions in the key words in the coverage clause for standard property 
insurance: “direct physical loss of or damage to property.” Erik S. Knutsen & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Infected 
Judgment: Creating Conventional Wisdom and Insurance Coverage Denial in a Pandemic, 27 CONN INS. 
L.J. 185 (cataloguing the multitude of different dictionary entries for each operative word in the clause). 
 115.  WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 19 (9th ed. 1984) (the “[o]rder of senses 
[in the dictionary] is historical.”).   
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broadly, and exclusion clauses are to be construed narrowly. And most 
important, the document’s intended function in the commercial 
marketplace matters. Is it a policy for disability insurance or is it a cell 
phone plan contract? 
The act of choosing a definition out of a listing found in a dictionary is 
not without problems either. Such a choice is subject to false consensus 
bias,116 meaning one chooses the definition one wants to choose and 
“thinks” it is the one everybody else will also choose.117 As D.C. Circuit 
Judge Harold Leventhal apparently observed when discussing court use 
of legislative history, choosing “the” definition out of a dictionary is like 
“looking out over a crowd and spotting your friends.”118 But the same, of 
course, is true regarding selection of a preferred dictionary definition.  
Insurers, and, of course, policyholders as well, know the answer they want 
and will naturally be drawn, at least subconsciously, to the definition that 
best meets their needs.  In addition, dictionary use may mislead through 
simple happenstance when a judge, or law clerk or counsel writing a brief 
that influences the judge, reaches for the dictionary on the closest shelf or 
reads only the first dictionary entry resulting from a browser search.   
There is something facially odd about using the dictionary to discern 
word meaning in insurance policies when the goal is to understand the 
“plain meaning” as understood by everyday people. People do not talk 
like the dictionary. People do not think like the dictionary. In fact, the aim 
of the dictionary is not to make it a catalogue of how reasonable people 
would grasp a word. It is to define the word as a referent in the English 
language to other words. And in many dictionary definitions, the word 
being defined is included in the definition! 
Why then do so many courts, when construing contractual language, 
reach for the dictionary over some other form of extrinsic evidence? The 
answer is simple—simplicity. Most judges have near-instant access to a 
dictionary. Just looking up a word, stating “that must be the meaning,” 
and moving on to some other dispute makes the job easy. It may be wrong, 
but it was easy. It felt “safe.” The dictionary feels like an apolitical 
reference. We happen to think blind reliance on dictionary usage is a 
 
 116.  See Linda Babcock & George Lowenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-
Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 109 (1997) (describing phenomenon and its impact in 
prompting disputants or negotiating parties to overvalue their own skills, conduct, and position in 
transactions or litigation). 
 117.  See Lawrence Solan, et al., supra note 89.   
 118.  See, e.g. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (citing a conversation with Judge Leventhal), 
quoted in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 
507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (paraphrasing Leventhal ); Abner J. Mikva, Statutory 
Interpretation: Getting the Law to Be Less Common, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 981–82 (1989); Adam M. 
Samaha, Looking Over a Crowd – Do More Interpretive Sources Mean More Discretion?, 92 NYU L. 
Rev. 554 (2017) (discussing the genealogy and meaning of the quote attributed to Judge Leventhal).  
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deplorable way to administer justice. We do not roll dice to determine 
damages. Why would we unflinchingly grab a text that is entirely 
unrelated to the contract at issue, pick out an entry that matches a word at 
issue in the contract, and say “the dictionary says this, the word means 
that . . . therefore the legal result in this context must be so.” This is not 
the court as a helpful agent. This is not even the court as an umpire. This 
is something else entirely. Dictionaries are not written to help determine 
legal disputes. Yet, American judicial practice would appear to indicate 
otherwise. So, when a strict textualist approach to contract construction 
breaks rank and reaches for the dictionary, such is not to be seen as a 
move to a more reasonable approach. It is no less contextual. In fact, it is 
probably less so because now some totally unrelated source of meaning 
is inserted into the process.  
A classic example of the horrors of blind dictionary usage in insurance 
law comes from the infamous string of cases about theft insurance. The 
definition of “theft” in the policy required “external violence” to the 
lockset for coverage of theft to attach.119 The reason behind using that 
phrase was to indicate that the insurer did not want to insure against inside 
theft jobs where the policyholder “misplaced” its own goods and claimed 
insurance proceeds. If the lock appeared smashed or otherwise tampered 
with, there was easy evidence that some miscreant broke in and stole the 
insured goods. However, there were many cases where a skilled lockpick 
entered insured premises and pilfered valuable goods. When the 
policyholder came to claim for the loss, the insurers denied coverage 
because there was no evidence of “external violence” on the locksets. The 
policyholder was no less robbed; it was just unlucky enough to have been 
robbed by a skilled robber.  
Courts frequently used dictionary definitions for the singularly 
operative words “external” and “violence” to hold that, for coverage to 
attach, the policy demanded there must be some physical change to the 
locks that was visible outside the locks. Using a dictionary to buttress 
such a textualist response only makes the result go from bad to worse. 
Saying the policyholders had no coverage for theft in the context of a theft 
policy, because the theft policy they bought demanded visibly physical 
changes to the locks, makes theft coverage a nullity for losses from all but 
the clumsiest of thieves. That surely could not be the intent of the insurer 
and most certainly is not the intent of the policyholder. But holding up the 
dictionary definitions of “external” and “violence” as “the” reasons for 
the loss of coverage simply strikes as baffling. These are cases where the 
dictionary is used to buttress an extreme version of textualism. 
 
 119.  See notes 41, 60, supra and note 122, infra (discussing caselaw regarding theft insurance 
requirement of visible marks of forced entry). 
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So, when is a dictionary definition helpful in the inquiry into word 
meaning? In our Integrative Approach to interpretation, a dictionary 
definition can be helpful as one source of extrinsic evidence, not to say, 
“this is the meaning” but to say, “wow, there are a lot of meanings for this 
term.” Rather, a dictionary could be one source, external to the agreement, 
that can indicate there may be a range of understandings of a certain term. 
Sometimes meanings change over time and a dictionary can be a helpful 
tool for knowing that, too. But certainly, a dictionary should never trump 
those extrinsic sources of context that are closer to the agreement itself, 
such as direct evidence from the drafters themselves, course of dealing, 
course of performance, standard industry term usage, marketing 
literature, or in the case of insurance policies, underwriting documents. In 
short, a dictionary should not be treated as a representation of “how 
people talk” or how reasonable people view the plain meaning of terms. 
It is not the “plain meaning manual” for judges. It is a disambiguated 
catalogue of historical word meanings that can be equally obtusely 
worded as the other document being construed. 
We think that, by following our Integrative Approach to insurance 
policy interpretation, courts will fall victim far less often to the 
duplicitous use of the dictionary. Using other indicia of word meaning 
that gets closer to a contextual analysis of the words at issue quickly 
protects courts from the dangers of incorrect dictionary usage.  
VI.  MAKING COURTS MORE USEFUL: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO 
INTERPRETATION  
A. The Philosophy of the Approach 
Although the tenacity of textualism may prove too great a barrier to 
change, American law and adjudication would be better off abandoning 
its textual religion in favor of a more Integrative Approach. Our aspiration 
is that judicial contract construction should be as useful as feasible to 
commerce and society. A narrowly textualist, strict plain meaning 
approach to deciding contract disputes and insurance policy construction 
unduly limits the ability of courts to be helpful to the enterprise of 
enforcing transactions, both consumer and commercial.  It only stands to 
reason that a court equipped with more intellectual tools for determining 
meaning will be better able to accurately determine meaning as well as 
when meaning may need to yield to considerations of public policy.   
We understand the textualist argument to the contrary.  It essentially 
posits that consideration of anything but the words of a contract document 
fail to sufficiently constrain judges from interjecting personal 
preferences.  For the reasons set forth above, we reject this argument.  
40
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Words are sufficiently malleable, such that a judge wishing, either 
consciously or unconsciously, to impose personal preferences upon a 
decision can easily do so through the textualist approach.  By contrast, 
contextual factors are likely to be at least as constraining as words.  One 
may, for example, quarrel about whether the word “sudden” connotes an 
abrupt development or merely one that is unexpected.120 It is more 
difficult to argue over the meaning of sales or underwriting notes 
reflecting an agreement that environmental liabilities would be covered 
unless resulting from expected or intended injury. 
One may, for example, argue about whether the word “suit” includes 
administrative proceedings from which liability may result, which in turn 
affects whether a liability insurer must defend the action.121 It is 
considerably more difficult to misread underwriting documents indicating 
the policy would cover administrative proceedings or the testimony of the 
broker that potential administrative actions were expressly discussed and 
anticipated by the parties at the time the policy was purchased. 
For example, in a case where a master thief was able to pull off theft 
without leaving a trace, such as picking the lock, one may take a hyper-
literal approach to a burglary policy and deny coverage for “theft” 
because the policy stipulates that “theft” coverage requires evidence of 
“external violence to the lock.”122 Yet, a denial of coverage would be 
extremely hard if not impossible to justify if one also read the 
underwriting notes instead of part of the policy, which indicated that the 
twin purposes of requiring evidence of “external violence to the lock” are 
to corroborate that the theft was not an inside job, leaving aside, of course, 
that the very point of the policy is to cover for “theft” and prompt 
policyholders to reasonably secure premises. 
The Integrative Approach to construing disputed insurance policy 
terms and resolving insurance coverage questions presents a path to 
improved insurance policy interpretation.  The contract and statutory 
 
 120.  See RANDY MANILOFF & JEFFREY STEMPEL, GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE: 
KEY ISSUES IN EVERY STATE Ch. 14 (4th ed. 2018) (noting split in caselaw regarding qualified pollution 
exclusion in operation during 1970-1986 time period, which barred pollution coverage unless the release 
of the pollutant was “sudden and accidental”; STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 41, § 14.11 (same re 
qualified pollution exclusion; also discussion of disputes over application of absolute pollution exclusion 
that replaced the former). 
 121. Compare Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 959 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1998) 
(notice of possible liability from environmental regulator not a “suit” within the meaning of CGL policy 
duty to defend obligations) with Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990) 
(finding such regulatory proceedings constitute “suit” under CGL policy).  
 122.   See, e.g., Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western National  Mutual Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271 
(Minn. 1985) (“burglary” defined as “[T]he felonious abstraction of insured property (1) from within the 
premises by a person making felonious entry therein by actual force and violence, of which force and 
violence there are visible marks made by tools, explosives, electricity or chemicals upon, or physical 
damage to, the exterior of the premises at the place of such entry”; court held that reasonable expectations 
of policyholder applied, as this policy was to cover “burglary.”). 
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construction considerations listed at the outset of this Article and 
discussed in this Part are of necessity presented in rough sequential order 
as we see the process unfolding in the typical case.  However, the order 
in which courts may consider interpretative factors is not fixed, save for 
the need to first appreciate the overall context and purpose of the 
insurance policy in question or any non-insurance transaction at issue.  
We contend it is vital to anchor the initial inquiry in that first step.  
There is a kinship among the Restatement (Second) of Contract’s 
contextual approach, Thomas Drayage, and the pre-2018 versions of 
RLLI § 3.123  Like these approaches, the Integrative Approach does not 
ignore the text of insurance policies and other contract documents.124  To 
the contrary, document text remains an important marker of meaning.  But 
when assessed through the Integrative Approach, document text—or, 
more precisely, an individual judge’s reading of the text in isolation—is 
not all-powerful.   
B. Application of the Approach 
The court faced with a coverage dispute should obtain a rough 
understanding of the context and chronology of the sale, underwriting, 
and placement of the insurance policy in question.  In short, what is the 
objective of the document? Why does it exist and what is it supposed to 
do? Who buys it and for what reasons? Then, the court should read the 
term or terms in dispute considering this background information, the 
policy as a whole, the type of policy at issue, the larger context of the 
parties’ transaction, the actions of the parties, and the nature of the 
transaction in general. 
Where the insurance policy defines a term, this of course is entitled to 
great weight, as it is a strong “internal” aid to interpretation. But the 
definition itself may need interpretation in which case the court can utilize 
the tools of the Integrative Approach to clarify any definitions contained 
in the policy. In addition to canons of word meaning, a court using the 
Integrative Approach may apply canons of substantive law or policy.   
Several canons specific to insurance are of particular importance.  First, 
 
 123.  Prior to the revisions resulting in the April 2018 RLLI, its section on insurance policy 
interpretation was less textual and more expressly contextual. 
 124.  Nor do we ban references to dictionaries.  We simply prefer that they not be treated as 
conclusive religious pronouncements that brook no dissent, particularly in view of the discretion courts 
have in selecting particular dictionaries and listed meanings.  Dictionaries are simply another form of 
extrinsic evidence, perhaps even very good extrinsic evidence.  But they are not a substitute for a broader 
analysis of a disputed term in light of the transaction under review.   Regarding judicial deployment of 
dictionaries, see generally Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies 
and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915 (2010); Kevin Werbach, Note, 
Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994).    
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insurance agreements should generally be broadly construed to affect the 
risk management objective, unless there is convincing evidence to suggest 
the parties intended a narrower goal and narrower reading of the 
agreement.  Second, exclusions in an insurance policy should be strictly 
and narrowly construed.  Third, the insurer asserting applicability of an 
exclusion should bear the burden of proof to demonstrate the applicability 
of the exclusion. Fourth, provisions of a policy that operate in an 
exclusion, such as definitions and conditions tending to defeat the 
coverage promised in the insuring agreement, should be treated like 
exclusions. Such provisions are those which remove coverage from the 
initial grant of coverage.  Like all contract provisions, exclusions should 
be subjected to the reasonable rules of contra proferentem. 
Exclusions deserve this less hospitable reception (as compared to 
insuring agreements), because they tend to defeat coverage and can 
disturb eminently reasonable expectations of coverage (particularly when 
the circumstances of the transaction make close study of policy text 
unlikely). The insurer’s role as the drafter of unclear policy text, with risk-
spreading as its core business function, makes it fairer to impose the costs 
of uncertainty upon the insurer rather than the policyholder in close cases.  
This may seem to some like an unduly pro-policyholder rule.  We note, 
however, that insurers have an advantage in that they can avoid unwanted 
liability through better drafting of policies and, as repeat players in 
coverage litigation, return to the drafting table if initially chosen language 
creates unwanted coverage obligations. Policyholders lack that recourse. 
In addition, even an insurer with ambiguous policy language should 
ordinarily have nothing to fear. If the insurer’s interpretation of the 
unclear language accords with the extrinsic information and transaction 
context, such as party understanding, underwriting, and risk management 
purpose, the insurer should prevail despite sub-optimal drafting.  
Ambiguous language should be construed against the insurer only as a 
tiebreaker of last resort. 
Regarding context and chronology, the court should be aware of what 
the parties were trying to accomplish with the transaction. When 
insurance is purchased, the purpose is obvious in one respect, that being 
to obtain insurance. We are suggesting something a little deeper, however, 
including a look at the risk management goals of the parties and the type 
of insurance product, such as general liability, professional liability, 
product recall insurance, and business interruption coverage, obtained 
through prevailing risk management concerns and practices.   
It may be the case, for example, that a subcontractor was required by 
the owner or general contractor to have insurance in place as a condition 
of obtaining the subcontract.  In such a case, the specifications of a job 
proposal may provide valuable information about what the insurance 
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policy was designed to accomplish—information that will inform the 
reading of policy text. Or, for example, if a policyholder purchases both 
an auto and homeowners' policy to cover legal liability, and the loss 
appears to lie somewhere in between the two policies’ grants of 
coverage,125 the court should assume it likely that one or both policies 
cover the loss and particularly focus on avoiding gaps in coverage for the 
consumer who tried to buy every kind of liability insurance and somehow 
got caught between the definitional cracks in the boards. Of course, there 
may well be gaps in coverage, but such gaps need to be discerned with 
reference to the entire risk-management scheme and not some artificial 
isolation where a court is almost wilfully blind to how concomitant 
insurance sources operate together. Courts thus need to be mindful of 
insurer efforts to design the scope of a policy’s coverage for a particular 
market niche.  For example, an automobile liability policy is not designed 
to cover the general liability risks of unsafe premises or defective 
products.126 
Reading the contract holistically reduces the risk of vocabulary 
myopia, wherein a court may attach what seems to be the “right” meaning 
to an isolated word in the policy where consideration of the policy 
suggests a different meaning for the word at issue. For example, the 
parties may dispute the meaning of a word such as “accident” standing 
alone.  However, other provisions of the policy may make it obvious that 
liability stemming from the policyholder’s regular business activity can 
be “accidents” even though the policyholder intentionally engaged in the 
business activity. 
The type of policy at issue will inform construction of policy terms.  
Although this will often merely confirm the court’s initial reading of 
policy text, it can provide greater certainty to the interpreting court as well 
as a window on the impact the decision may have. For example, an 
upscale steakhouse restaurant may purchase a general liability policy.  
The restaurant serves alcohol. Is it covered for dram shop liability?  
Commercial general liability (“CGL”) policies typically contain an 
exclusion for claims arising under or related to the sale of alcohol.  
However, because the policy was purchased by an upscale steakhouse 
restaurant, such restaurants usually serve alcohol, which supports the 
policyholder’s claim of an objectively reasonable expectation of 
coverage. However, because general liability and liquor liability risks 
have long been considered different and thus segmented in the insurance 
 
 125.  As is the case in many liability cases involving concurrent causation. See generally Erik S. 
Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 
957 (2010); Peter Nash Swisher, Insurance Causation Issues: The Legacy of Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co., 2 NEV. L.J. 351 (2002). 
 126.  TOM BAKER & KYLE LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY (3d ed. 2013) at 417. 
44
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/5
2021] REJECTING WORD WORSHIP 605 
market as two different products, the court can be comfortable applying 
the language of the liquor liability exclusion quite literally.   
Unless there were representations made that would support waiver or 
estoppel, longstanding custom and practice, as well as the insuring 
environment, support application of the liquor liability exclusion that is 
broadly but clearly written. Consequently, in this type of dispute, the 
regime of narrow construction of exclusionary language is of no help to 
the policyholder who bought general liability insurance and not liquor 
liability insurance.  The policyholder may, however, have a claim against 
the agent or broker who failed to recommend liquor liability insurance.  
The agent or broker may in turn have a claim against its errors and 
omissions insurer. 
The larger context of an insurance policy purchase includes the history 
of the parties’ contracting relations, specifically whether the parties were 
engaged in a one-time contract, recently started transacting business, or 
were involved in a longer pattern of a relational contract or series of 
relational contracts. This can include a course of dealing or course of 
performance regarding application of similar contracts.  For example, the 
parties may have exhibited a longstanding pattern regarding treatment of 
claims.   
After having made this initial assessment of the meaning of disputed 
policy language, the court then considers where any relevant usage in 
trade is applicable as well as course of dealing and course of performance.  
With such background understanding to contextualize policy terms, the 
court may then consult what might be termed “internal” aids to 
interpretation as necessary. Some may be imbedded in the contract, 
statute, or insurance policy at issue. For example, the writing under 
review may contain specifically defined terms. 
Judicial consultation may then be necessary to interpret “external” aids, 
such as technical manuals, industry materials, common statutory 
definitions of terms, or other evidence of popular usage. If the contract in 
question has a drafting history, which standardized insurance policies 
usually include, this can also be consulted by the court. 
If there is specific information about the parties’ specific intent 
regarding a policy term, evidence of this intent may be considered by the 
court. Examples are correspondence or other communications of the 
parties reflecting specific understanding or intent.   
In many cases, background or contextual information will be 
essentially uncontested, without disputes regarding whether a letter is 
genuine, a meeting was held, contents of an explanatory brochure mean 
this or that, and so on.  However, in some cases there may be genuine 
disputes regarding the “who, what, when, where, and how” questions 
surrounding a transaction. In addition to disputes regarding the facts 
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surrounding entry into a contract or purchase of an insurance policy, there 
may also be disputes regarding past practices of the parties, industry 
custom, claims adjusting conduct, or the like.   
In these situations, determining policy meaning via pretrial motion 
would seem inapt. If documentary language is clear, and contrary 
extrinsic information is refuted, suspect, or inadmissible, then a trial may 
be unnecessary.  However, in at least a significant subset of cases, a trial 
or hearing may be required. This is not to suggest that contract 
construction ceases being a matter of law in such cases.  Rather, when 
there are genuine factual disputes bearing on interpretation of the contract, 
those facts must be resolved as a prerequisite to interpretation. 
Even in the aggressive post-Twiqbal and Trilogy world,127 this will 
likely require some modest increase in bench or jury trials.  Textualists 
and judicial imperialists will regard this as a drawback of the Integrative 
Approach.  We disagree.  Greater use of the trial mechanism for fact-
finding is part of what the judicial system is supposed to deliver.  The 
settlement norms and tendencies of disputants are already well-
established and unlikely to change even for disputes that survive motions 
to dismiss and for summary judgment.  Consequently, greater willingness 
to consider and determine facts bearing on contract meaning will not 
impose an unduly high price on the judicial system.   
Further, when conducting cost-benefit analyses of trials, some 
perspective is in order.  Avoidance of a trial does not mean avoidance of 
adjudication through other means, such as pre-trial motion.  This type of 
adjudication “on the papers” or in chambers (which usually includes oral 
argument prior to decision) may seem streamlined as compared to trial, 
but it is not free.  It may consume more judicial resources issuing written 
opinions on motions than would be expended on a hearing or trial 
 
 127.  Although there may be legitimate debate about whether the development is wise or foolish 
(we think the latter), there is really no dispute that the past 40 years have witnessed both a reduction in 
trials and doctrine more receptive to pretrial disposition of matters by judges.  See Stephen N. Subrin & 
Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014); Arthur 
R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 
DUKE L.J. 1 (2010); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003).  
  “Twiqbal” refers to the cases of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), which empowered judges to grant dismissal for failure to state a 
claims via Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) if the trial judge found the claim sufficiently “implausible” based on 
the judge’s “experience and common sense” (but without much deference to Seventh Amendment rights 
to jury trial).  See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 
1851 (2008); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) 
Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. J. L. & POL’Y 61 (2007). 
  The “Trilogy” refers to three important 1986 U.S. Supreme Court decisions that facilitated 
increased use of summary judgment:  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 
(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).  
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addressing fact questions bearing on contract meaning.128  Further, the 
existence of fact questions may not require trial of an entire matter but 
only a hearing to resolve disputed facts, provided this can be done 
consistent with Seventh Amendment concerns or with party consent to a 
bench trial of the issue. 
Perhaps the primary external aid to construing contract and insurance 
policy language is the other court decisions construing the same or similar 
language.  Courts consult other judicial opinions, particularly those with 
precedential value in the jurisdiction as a matter of course regarding the 
construction to be given terms.  Such consultation may be for learning 
from other courts’ readings of the text or for acquiring additional 
knowledge that may be gleaned from the opinion concerning the type of 
text, business, or activity under review.  In similar fashion, courts may 
consider treatises, law review articles, or other secondary sources that 
may shed light on word meaning or the business or activity involved in 
connection with the coverage claim. 
 If this array of tools is insufficiently conclusive or appears to lead to a 
problematic result, the court can consider where apt the identity of the 
document as something other than a contract.  For insurance, this can be 
particularly useful because of the multiple identities of insurance policies 
as not only contracts but also products,129 private legislation,130 social 
instruments or institutions,131 and outputs of a regulated industry.132   
During this process, courts should consider whether any applicable 
legislation bears on the interpretative process.  For example, many states 
have statutes setting forth ground rules and methodologies for statutory 
construction.133  Although such statutes may have separation of powers 
implications,134 they at least require consideration. Statutes 
 
 128.  See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Iliberalism Seriously: Judicial Humility, Aggregate 
Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice, 43 LOYOLA L.J. 627 (2012) (also noting that roughly a third of 
summary judgments appealed result in partial reversal or remand, undermining the efficiency claims of 
summary judgment). 
 129.  See Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, supra note 53; Schwarcz, Products Liability, 
supra note 53.  
 130.  See Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, supra note 53. 
 131.  See Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument, supra note 53. 
 132.  See Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2013), 
sources cited in note 53, supra. 
 133.  See Kevin Doty, My Hero Zero: The Forgotten NRS Chapter, NEV. LAWYER, Feb. 2007, at 
28 (describing Nevada statute directing statutory construction); Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive 
Directions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. ON. LEGIS. 211, 217 (1994) (surveying statutes setting forth ground 
rules for construction). 
 134.  To the extent a statute purports to direct the judicial process itself, it presents separation of 
powers concerns.  A legislative body is of course completely free (subject to constitutional constraints) to 
enact the positive law it wishes and to define the terms used in a statute.  But where the legislature sets 
forth a methodology for statutory interpretation, one may legitimately wonder whether this constitutes an 
excessive effort to administer the judiciary and control adjudicative outcomes.  But legislation has 
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choreographing contract construction appear considerably less common 
but may raise even more serious separation of powers concerns.135 
A court construing an insurance policy, or other contract or statute, may 
at any time apply protocols of textual interpretation such as grammar rules 
and canons of word meaning to the extent that these are apt in light of the 
background and context of the disputed document under review.  
However, if this is done at the outset of the interpretive process, it may 
distort the process by saddling the court with unrealistic assumptions 
regarding the actual drafting of the language under consideration.   
Textual canons of construction can be helpful to the extent that they 
shed light on the apt meaning of the word, but they can also be 
contradictory and misleading, particularly if applied outside the contexts 
that gave rise to the canons.  Some canons seem simply wrong in terms 
of modern speech patterns or customary communication prevailing in a 
particular field.136  A court is likely to better appreciate the aptness of a 
particular canon of construction for use in the case at hand if the court 
first has an adequate understanding of the background, context, and 
function of the contract or insurance policy at issue. 
Canons of substantive law may be apt, provided they are correct 
statements of substantive law or policy that do not contradict statutes, 
caselaw, or aspects of the insurance policy or contract under review.  Care 
should be taken so that invocation of a substantive canon does not become 
imposition of judicial personal preferences under the guise of legal 
process neutrality.  That said, neutral application of substantive policy 
canons of contract construction should not be problematic.   
For example, canons against enforcement of illegal or unconscionable 
 
nonetheless long set forth norms such as liberal or strict construction of particular legislation and this has 
not seemed to bother courts. 
 135.   Where the legislature’s own products – statutes – are concerned, we think the legislature 
logically has more leeway in setting forth not only what it means to achieve via a statute but also should 
to a degree be able to indicate the scope of the statute and whether a liberal or strict construction is intended 
or envisioned.  But contract law has historically been the domain of common law that has shaped contract 
doctrine.  To be sure, legislatures can enact contract rules such as the Uniform Commercial Code.  But 
this is different than instructing courts as to how to go about common law decision-making. 
 136.  For example, one textual canon posits that word in a contract or other document has its own 
meaning and that writings should not be construed to be repetitive or redundant.  See SCALIA & GARNER, 
supra note 5, at 174 (setting forth “Surplusage Canon” holding that “[i]f possible, every word and every 
provision [of a statute or contract] is to be given effect.  None should be ignored. None should needlessly 
be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.”). 
But this canon simply seems wrong, at least in many cases involving legal issues.  One need not look far, 
for example, to find a will in which the testator states that she will “give, bequeath and devise” (three 
repetitive redundancies) or a discovery request for any documents “depicting, describing, addressing, 
summarizing, discussing, or relating to” a topic.  Redundancy is an occupational hazard of legal 
documents, prompted by a drafter’s fear that expressing a concept in a single work may lead to 
misunderstanding (so much for the benefits of a purely textual approach).  As a result, drafters repeat 
themselves.  Consider, for example, the pollution exclusion found in a standard form CGL insurance 
policy, which uses roughly twenty words to convey the concept of an unwanted substance or waste matter.  
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terms appear justified, provided they are not broadly applied to nullify  
agreements that are not blatantly unfair or likely to encourage 
socioeconomic mischief.  Greater use of some currently  under-applied 
substantive canons of contract construction seem apt.  For example, one 
substantive canon is that “law abhors a forfeiture,” something worth 
remembering when addressing defenses to coverage that, if successful, 
preclude indemnity for which years of premiums may have been paid.  
Canons favoring broad construction of insuring agreements and narrow 
construction of exclusionary language are in the same vein in that they 
encourage different approaches to words based on their location in the 
insurance policy and whether the words seek to establish or restrict 
coverage.137  Another is the canon favoring construction in furtherance of 
the public interest.138 
After consideration of the foregoing factors, the entire list of which 
would often be inapplicable to a particular dispute, the court has likely 
determined the correct reading of the disputed term.  To be more of a legal 
realist about it, the judge has likely assigned the term a particular meaning 
based on applying policy language as well as considering extrinsic 
evidence and contextual factors.  If the meaning of the disputed term 
remains unclear, the contra proferentem principle is applied as a 
tiebreaker of last resort to determine the meaning the court will assign. 
Before turning the assigned meaning of a term into an adjudicative 
ruling on contract meaning, the court needs to first consider whether the 
contract as so construed would be void for illegality,139 
unconscionability,140 or inconsistency with public policy 
considerations.141  For example, a given jurisdiction may view punitive 
damages as uninsurable under state public policy trumping typical 
liability language, committing the insurer to pay damages without regard 
to the categorization of the damages.142 
 
 137.  See TAN 40, supra (discussing treatment of exclusionary provisions in insurance policies). 
 138.  See Patterson, supra note 61, at 854 (“If a public interest is affected by a contract, that 
interpretation or construction is preferred which favors the public interest.”). 
 139.  See PERILLO, supra note 4, § 3.7(e), ch. 22 (illegal contracts, even if clear, are not 
enforceable); FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 5.1 (same). 
 140.  See PERILLO, supra note 4, § 3.7(e) (unconscionable contract terms, even if clear, are not 
enforceable; unconscionability defined as combination of bargaining defect and pronounced substantive 
unfairness); FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 4.28 (same). See, e.g., Gonski v. Dist. Ct., 245 P.3d 1164 (Nev. 
2010) (adopting “sliding scale” approach to unconscionability in which varying amounts of “procedural” 
and “substantive” unconscionability in combination may make contract provision unenforceable).  See 
also Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 
485, 487 (1967) (coining terms “procedural” and “substantive” unconscionability). 
 141.  See PERILLO, supra note 4, ch. 22, § 22.11 (contract terms that violate public policy will not 
be enforced or may be modified to comply with public policy); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, Ch. 5. 
 142.  MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 120, Ch. 20 (noting state divergence in treatment of 
punitive damages). 
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These backstops of contract construction constitute the standard 
conception of judicial “policing” of insurance policies or other 
contracts.143 This remains a valuable role for this sort of traditional 
supervision by courts, particularly the use of the unconscionability 
doctrine in consumer cases should an insurance policy provision be 
oppressive in application.  We also find no barrier to such judicial activity 
on “freedom of contract” grounds.  We term this type of judicial activity 
“Type I Policing” of contracts in which the court declines to give full 
enforcement to the interpretation that has been reached regarding 
meaning of a contract.  An example from insurance law is the refusal of 
most courts to require a policyholder to undergo a medical procedure that 
an insurer believes will reduce its coverage liability.144 
In addition, there is another, softer variety of “Type II Policing” of 
contracts in which courts construe provisions in a manner consistent with 
at least one interpretation of the agreement, although not necessarily the 
literal or most natural reading, in order to avoid disproportionate 
forfeiture or other adverse impacts on either the parties or society. 
Examples from insurance law include requiring the insurer to demonstrate 
prejudice from late notice of a claim or loss by the policyholder145 and 
refusal to enforce an anti-assignment clause where assignment post-dates 
the loss and did not increase the risk borne by the insurer.146  
A more comprehensive and Integrative Approach to contract 
construction can, in apt cases, operate as Type II policing of contracts by 
the judiciary and correspondingly reduce the need for Type I policing 
because of better judicial construction of disputed contract terms. The 
improvement will only increase over time, as the body of jurisprudence 
construing standard policy terms will grow and become self-referential in 
a cohesive fashion that is currently not the case. 
The comprehensive template of the Integrative Approach has a length 
that makes it look daunting and burdensome. However, in the concrete 
setting of a particular dispute, the list will almost always shrink based on 
what is applicable to the particular case.  More importantly, courts that 
apply the proposed Integrative Approach can largely rely on counsel to 
 
 143.  See Perillo, supra note 4, ch. 3 (discussing judicial unwillingness to enforce problematic text); 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, chs. 4, 5 (discussing “policing the agreement” and “unenforceability on 
grounds of public policy and unconscionability).   
 144.  See, e.g., Heller v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 833 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying Illinois 
law and refusing to require policyholder receiving disability benefits to undergo surgery for carpel tunnel 
syndrome that insurer believed would permit physician policyholder to return to work). 
 145.  This “notice-prejudice” rule is the norm in all but a few states, with most all notice-prejudice 
states requiring the insurer to prove prejudice from late notice rather than requiring the insurer to prove 
lack of prejudice.  See MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 120, ch. 4. 
 146.  See Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court, 354 P.3d 302 (Cal. 2015) (overruling Henkel Corp. v. 
Hartford Acc. & Indem Ins. Co., 62 P.3d 69 (Cal. 2003)); Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 100 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1939) (applying Minnesota law). 
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present, in digestible form, the information falling within the categories 
of this list.   
If counsel is not forthcoming with such information regarding 
uncertain or difficult text in a contract document, the court faced with 
such challenging language may request briefing that includes contextual 
information or even schedule a “show cause” order demanding 
information regarding industry standards, usage in trade, course of 
dealing, or communications pertaining to the parties’ understanding of a 
dispute term or expectations regarding a transaction.  
Counsel who wants to prevail will bring this information to the court.  
If they refrain, because this information undermines their textual 
argument, opposing counsel is highly likely to place this information 
before the court.  Courts need to do “heavy lifting” to discern extra-textual 
information only where sufficiently interested or if they deem it necessary 
to avert grave injustice due to lack of competent counsel or severe 
imbalance of resources. 
C. Distinguishing the Integrative Approach From Alternative Methods 
At this point, one might ask what is different about our proposed 
Integrative Approach, as compared to the contextual approach of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts or the pre-January 2018 RLLI 
approach, at least as we construe the former RLLI Approach as largely 
following Pacific Gas & Electric v. Thomas Drayage.  The short, but 
perhaps humbling, answer is “not all that much.”  We freely concede that 
our proposed Integrated Approach to construing document text of 
insurance policies, contracts generally, and statutes, as well as compacts, 
treaties, and constitutions, has considerable kinship with both approaches.   
Although such kinship may deem our proposal not particularly 
innovative, it also means our proposal is not radical, untested, or 
unworkable.  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts was published 40 
years ago.  Although it did not obtain complete acceptance in the courts, 
it has enjoyed substantial favor and is the expressed law of many 
jurisdictions.  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has been very 
influential, even if unable to displace the hegemony of textualism.  We 
regard the Restatement’s approach to contract construction as 
dramatically superior to a confined textual inquiry. Our goal is to 
convince readers across the profession that a refined, updated, slightly 
expanded version of the Restatement approach fused with the Thomas 
Drayage receptiveness to extrinsic evidence deserves wider acceptance, 
particularly regarding construction of insurance policies. 
Thomas Drayage was decided 50 years ago and, although perhaps 
constrained in its scope by subsequent California cases, establishes a 
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receptive approach to textual interpretation that appears to have worked 
well for a half-century.  To state the obvious, California is the largest state 
in the union not only in population but also economically and legally. It 
has thrived during this period. Would this really happen if California’s 
contract law was bad or even subpar? Either in the abstract or as compared 
to textualism?  We think not.  Contract law is considered perhaps the most 
important part of law regarding business operations. By comparison, 
jurisdictions generally viewed as more textualist, such as New York, have 
lost ground economically to California during this same period. 
Frankly, any approach to construction is superior to “High-Church” 
textualism that refuses to consider indicia of meaning other than policy 
text or the text of other standardized contract forms. Although similar to 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Thomas Drayage, and pre-2018 
RLLI § 3, the Integrative Approach differs from these other defensible 
approaches and improves upon them in several respects.   
First, under the Integrative Approach, before even beginning to assess 
the text of the contract document or statute, the court surveys the 
background history that brought the document into being.  We have long 
been puzzled at the legal orthodoxy of beginning to examine disputed 
document language, with the language before first becoming at least a 
little bit familiar with the events giving rise to the dispute—in particular, 
the transaction that is subject of the document under review.  To us, it is 
like beginning to read and understand a book without some inkling of 
whether it is a mystery, science textbook, travel journal, gardening 
manual, or pornography.  Consider how the words “hot,” “pot,” “fast,” 
“cool,” and “jerk” all can have quite different meanings in these various 
genres. 
In the realm of contract and insurance disputes, it similarly makes sense 
to know what business or consumer activity initiated a transaction as well 
as something about the relationship of the parties and genesis of the 
dispute before reading the disputed text. It is curiously bizarre in 
insurance that courts regularly do not make a practice of familiarizing 
themselves with the subject of the insurance policy in the commercial 
marketplace. If the court were similarly construing terms in a cell phone 
contract, for example, the words in that document would be informed by 
that context, instead of the words appearing in a house mortgage 
agreement. This is by no means extrinsic evidence. It is evidence of what 
the “thing” is to be construed. How can one make an informed decision 
about word meaning without at least knowing what kind of document “the 
thing” happens to be? 
Second, the Integrative Approach is arguably even less text-dependent 
than the Restatement (Second) of Contracts or pre-2018 RLLI approaches 
in that the party seeking to introduce extrinsic evidence in contradiction 
52
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/5
2021] REJECTING WORD WORSHIP 613 
of the prevailing view of the meaning of the text is not required to set 
forth an alternative meaning to which the contested text is susceptible.  It 
is sufficient for the party to argue that the challenged text is not properly 
part of the agreement or is an inaccurate memorialization of the 
agreement.  What is generally but perhaps misleadingly referred to as 
contract reformation147 is part of the Integrative Approach.   
Modern contract law in most jurisdictions permits such challenges 
pursuant to doctrines of mistake, fraud, or reformation.148  We would 
prefer that this concept be incorporated into core contract construction 
doctrine and used at the outset of the analysis.  It becomes misleading 
otherwise to go through the exercise of formulating a meaning of a term 
devoid of its context to then back out of that meaning for some other, 
unrelated reason. The text of a document may be completely in error or 
in contradiction to the promises made and transaction entered into by the 
parties.  When this occurs, the party aggrieved should not need to offer a 
plausible alternative reading of language that never should have been in 
memorialization of the agreement at all.  The aggrieved party should also 
be able to make this argument without the need to satisfy the elements of 
the mistake, reformation, or fraud escape hatches.  
Similarly, the Integrative Approach rejects the minority view of the 
parol evidence rule preventing extrinsic evidence regarding lack of full 
integration of a contract document.  Pursuant to the majority approach to 
parol evidence, a contract document’s recitation that it is integrated, and 
thus permits no consideration of evidence outside the four corners of the 
document, may be challenged through introduction of evidence showing 
that the recitation is inaccurate.149   
Although one can make a good case for eliminating the parol evidence 
rule entirely, as most European countries have done,150 the Integrative 
Approach does not go to such lengths.  It does, however, take a narrower 
 
 147.  See, e.g., Bd. of Trs., U. of Ill. v. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd., 969 F.2d 4329 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying 
Illinois law. The court “reforms” policy to make it clear that full policy limits apply to stub policy period 
of less than a year but in essence is not reforming or changing the policy but merely revising language to 
reflect the meaning always attached to the policy). 
 148.  See PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 3.7, 9.25-9.40 (discussing doctrines of fraud, mistake, and 
reformation); FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, §§ 4.10, 7.5, 9.2-9.3 (same). 
 149.  See PERILLO, supra note 4, Ch. 3 (discussing parol evidence rule and jurisdictional differences 
regarding admissibility of evidence bearing on the question of whether document if fully integrated); 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, §§ 7.2-7.6  (same). 
 150.  The pre-EU law of most European nations and the EU’s Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts(“PICC”) as well as the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) 
lack the parol evidence rule and appear to have functioned well.  See See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE 
LAW, U.N. CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, Art. 6, U.N. Sales 
No. E.10.V.14 (2010).  See, e.g., MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, 
S.p.A. 144 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1998) (permitting buyer in case governed by CISG to introduce extrinsic 
evidence disputing writing containing a limitation on remedies where contract stated it was fully 
integrated). 
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view of what constitutes parol evidence than do many courts.  Often, parol 
evidence and extrinsic evidence are treated as synonyms.  This is akin to 
decisions that speak of “jurisdiction” without regard to whether the term 
means power to hear a matter (subject matter jurisdiction), power over a 
party (personal jurisdiction), inability to extend a deadline (a 
“jurisdictional” limitation), or the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in 
administrative law.    
We consider parol evidence to be solely evidence of pre-contract 
negotiations offered to contradict clear terminology in a contract 
document memorializing an agreement.  Pursuant to the parol evidence 
rule in the United States, such evidence may not be received.  However, 
extrinsic evidence about the background and setting of a transaction, the 
nature of the businesses and business relations, industry custom and 
practice, and surrounding circumstances, such as a war or natural disaster, 
may properly be considered without violating the parol evidence rule. 
The Integrative Approach also embraces a view of a reasonable 
expectations analysis closer to the strong Keeton form than is otherwise 
found in most cases.151  Recall that pursuant to the strongest form of 
reasonable expectations analysis, a policyholder’s objectively reasonable 
expectations may trump even clear policy language.  The Integrative 
Approach does not support automatic displacement or de facto revision 
of policy text solely based on policyholder expectations, but it does permit 
expectations to overcome text when such expectations are sufficiently 
supported by additional factors, such as the evidence of policy purpose 
and function at odds with the language of the policy. 
We realize this suggestion is guaranteed to raise the hackles of insurers, 
who can be expected to argue that the policy language reflects policy 
intent and purpose.  If they are correct, they will prevail.  However, where 
insurers sell policies that are inapt to serve the intended market function 
for the policyholder, the insurer should not be able to escape coverage 
based on a literalist application of language that usually was not even 
provided to the policyholder until after purchase of the insurance, and for 
that matter, was probably never even read by the policyholder.   
Unfortunately, the adage that the “large print giveth” while the “small 
print taketh away” has reflected too much of the practice of modern 
contracting, including insurance contracting.  This approach should be 
eradicated and replaced by a rule of interpretation that requires contract 
designers, and those documenting contracts, to sell products consistent 
with the purchaser’s purpose or take sufficient steps to prevent 
policyholders from forming reasonable conceptions of coverage 
inconsistent with the policy form.   
 
 151.  See TAN 41 addressing the reasonable expectation approach and its variants. 
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The same holds true for contract documents in other contexts.  This 
may require an expansion of some insurance products or other 
contractually-based services, under which insurers and other vendors are 
entitled to charge correspondingly higher premiums and prices.  
Alternatively, insurers and other vendors must take steps to prevent 
purchasers from getting the “wrong” view from the insurer/vendor 
perspective but nonetheless the “reasonable” view.  This is not as difficult 
as it seems.   
Recall that a policyholder’s subjective or idiosyncratic view of 
coverage is entitled to essentially no weight, the exception being 
situations where the subjective or idiosyncratic view represents a specific 
contracting intent of the parties.  Consequently, all an insurer must do is 
something sufficiently informative to prevent the mythical “reasonable” 
policyholder from believing there is coverage for categories of loss or 
claim the insurer does not wish to cover.  Rather than “hiding” limitations 
on coverage in a lengthy list of exclusions, conditions, or definitions, the 
insurer probably need only use a summary brochure to which the 
purchaser’s attention is directed, perhaps with some commentary of the 
sales agent walking the purchaser through the checklist of the policy’s 
scope and limitations.  Specifically, for internet purchases of insurance, 
this could be done by requiring the purchaser to check off a disclaimer list 
item by item.  
This sort of practice has remarkable potential to broaden the insurer’s 
tools in marketing and selling policies. It may also drastically reduce 
litigation costs, as the insurer would not be limited to one “true” source 
of meaning: the policy. Thus far, insurers are often reluctant to provide 
such information to policyholders for fear of conflicting a favorable 
reading of policy terms. However, if such documents regularly become 
part of the Interpretive Approach, insurers may well be more ready to 
invest in such documents, thus decreasing litigation overall because terms 
will cease to be legalistic anachronisms, and policyholders will be more 
informed regarding their coverage rights.  
This type of activity would go a long way toward prompting greater 
flow of coverage information to policyholders at a more relevant time 
than post-loss.152 If a policyholder has greater information about coverage 
when that information is relevant to the policyholder, there is a far greater 
potential for the policyholder to control her behavior with an eye to 
avoiding insurance moral hazard concerns. Frankly, courts too need to 
know about coverage information when promulgating judicial rules about 
insurance policy interpretation.153 
 
 152.  Daniel Schwarcz, Coverage Information in Insurance Law, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1457, 1507 
(2017). 
 153.   Id. 
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Perhaps the most significant difference between the proposed 
Integrative Approach and its Restatement (Second) of Contracts and pre-
2018 RLLI § 3 allies is that the Integrative Approach not only permits 
consideration of a broad range of contextual factors and information at 
variance with the preferred meaning of text but also permits assessment 
of document text through prisms other than contract.   
Regarding insurance policies, courts using the Integrative Approach 
may consider alternative characterizations of insurance policies as 
products, private legislation, social instruments, or a regulated industry.154  
This is not to suggest that insurance policies do not remain contracts for 
purposes of legal analysis but is a means of providing additional context 
and understanding about the contractual arrangement under review. 
For example, recognizing that insurance policies, particularly standard 
form policies and especially those purchased by consumers, often operate 
more like a purchased product rather than a negotiated deal, can assist the 
court in better determining the purpose and function of the policy and 
intent of the “contracting” parties.  This understanding is likely to lead to 
improved interpretation of policy language.  Knowing something about 
the insurance “product” under review can also assist the court in 
determining what objectively reasonable expectations might be held by 
policyholders, insurers, and others relying on the policy.  This in turn can, 
at a minimum, inform the interpretation of policy language and be used if 
the court is inclined to apply a strong Keeton-esque version of the 
reasonable expectations approach.   
Likewise, the wide use of ISO insurance policy forms promulgated for 
the property or casualty industry has aspects of private legislation, 
industry standards akin to construction safety protocols or Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and other professional trade or 
guild standards. Appreciating these observations provide additional 
contextual background for assessing the meaning of policy text.  Like the 
product analogy, the insurance-policy-as-statute approach can also 
illuminate party expectations and understandings of the operation and 
purpose of the insurance in question.  
Similarly, viewing insurance policies in their role as social instruments 
or socioeconomic institutions assists interpretation by noting the function 
of the insurance policy in question.  Presumptively, policy text should be 
consistent with the ordinary functioning of the insurance under review in 
the larger scheme of risk management.155  Knowing something about that 
 
 154.  See notes 53, 60, 129-32, supra, citing publications arguing for consideration of insurance 
policies as products, private legislation, social institutions, social instruments, and the activity of a 
regulated industry. 
 155.  We say “presumptively” because the parties are of course free to depart from conventional 
understanding through customized provisions of the policy.  For example, an insurer may specifically 
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larger scheme of things and ordinary function of the insurance assists a 
court in construing policy language.   
The view of insurance as a regulated industry akin to a utility can also 
be illuminating in that it, like the other characterizations discussed above, 
can increase a court’s contextual understanding of the insurance in 
question and its relation to the activity of the disputing parties. For 
example, some kinds of insurance, such as auto insurance, may be 
mandatory to purchase to perform a certain act, such as driving a motor 
vehicle.  Most financial institutions that are regulated industries require 
the purchase of insurance before issuing a home mortgage. Accounting 
for these regulated responses may counsel in favor of invalidating a policy 
provision inconsistent with the regulatory scheme or mandating coverage 
consistent with regulatory minimums or objectives.  It may also negate 
proffered public policy arguments in favor of coverage where prevailing 
regulation does not align with or support the suggested public policy. 
Further, it may even provide a safe harbor on the ground that a policy 
form approved by regulators cannot be illegal, facially unconscionable, 
or in violation of state public policy. 
Although our thinking in this area is most developed regarding 
insurance, we believe that many types of contracts are susceptible to what 
might be termed “heuristic re-characterization” which views the 
instrument or transaction under review not only as a contract but also 
appreciates alternative conceptions of the transaction.  Almost all widely-
used standardized contracts, particularly those marketed to consumers, 
can be seen as products as well as contracts, such as a lease, provider 
agreement, repair or service agreement, and club membership. 
Like the contextual and California approaches, the Integrative 
Approach is receptive to specific information about party intent, such as 
pre-dispute correspondence regarding the meaning of policy text.  
Likewise, the Integrative Approach is receptive to information regarding 
usage in trade, course of dealing, course of performance, the relational 
nature of a contract, and party history and conventions. The Integrative 
Approach is also receptive to the extra-textual tools routinely used by 
even the most textual courts, such as dictionaries (though with caution 
about their inherent limitations, as noted in Part IV), canons of word 
meaning, treatises, precedent, drafting history, and other industry 
materials. This includes not only other court decisions construing the 
same or similar language but also precedent that does not address the 
same language but otherwise illuminates the interpretative issues before 
 
exclude a risk ordinarily covered under a general liability policy because of the particular policyholder’s 
exposure to such risk (or, alternatively, use a sublimit or special endorsement regarding the risk or charge 
additional premium).  Such deviations from the normal scope of coverage should be sufficiently 
consensual and clear before a court deprives a policyholder of ordinarily expected coverage.     
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the court.  For example, there may be an opinion providing background 
on the development of a type of insurance policy, discussing industry 
custom and practice, or examining the type of business or personal 
activity involved in the dispute.     
VII. THE FEASIBILITY AND FLEXIBILITY OF THE INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 
The Integrative Approach has a distinct advantage to prior approaches, 
especially a textual purist approach: the Integrative Approach does not 
have to be applied in baroque fashion in every case. In fact, it may well 
be reserved for only the “hard cases,” where actual meaning of a term is 
a palpable issue. In many, perhaps even most cases, a simple peek at the 
policy language leads a court to the inevitably reasonable conclusion of 
whether there is coverage. Therefore, there would be no need to resort to 
an Integrative Approach which prompts a court to consider purpose in a 
detailed fashion.  
For example, if a policyholder is arguing that she should have general 
liability coverage when she is sued for prematurely terminating a contract, 
a court can quickly rule that there is no coverage and probably no potential 
for coverage, because there would be no “physical injury to tangible 
property”. This sort of finding is one that can be derived from the 
language of the policy alone or the language assessed with a “quick look” 
at the context, circumstances, custom, and practice. Both methods would 
arrive at the same just result.  
The Integrative Approach thus does not require a “deep dive” into non-
textual or extra-textual factors in the ordinary case and will therefore not 
add much adjudicative burden. Its application can exist on a continuum. 
For the close case, where the meaning of a term is at issue, the Integrative 
Approach will of course require more heavy lifting by counsel and courts, 
although these cases always take longer under a textual approach as well. 
This, however, is justified by the need to achieve more just results and 
confident rulings in tricky cases.  
The Integrative Approach also holds potential for implications beyond 
insurance policy construction alone. Armed with the Integrative 
Approach, a court is in a far better position to make important 
determinations about insurer and policyholder conduct. We can foresee 
the advantage of the Integrative Approach in court inquiries into 
policyholder misrepresentation or fraud, and even into insurer bad faith. 
An inquiry into whether the insurer has acted unreasonably or failed to 
give equal consideration to the interests of the policyholder can be more 
appropriately conducted by a court taking an Integrative Approach, 
because that court is then able to uncover unreasonable assertions of non-
coverage by the insurer, such as a flat-out refusal to defend in the face of 
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clear coverage—to name a particularly egregious example. Thus, courts 
may be less willing to grant summary judgment to an insurer on grounds 
that a claim was “fairly debatable” because the Integrative Approach may 
well show that such is not the case. 
In addition to being flexible enough to operate on a continuum as 
needed, the Integrative Approach provides a better solution for producing 
more just interpretive results than those approaches that, as a major 
component in the interpretive exercise, purport to rely on disambiguated 
consumer survey evidence of a target population’s lay understanding of a 
policy term. Indeed, we think that type of evidence ranges from unhelpful 
at best to misleading at worst, because it is simply an extreme form of 
hyper-textualism in different clothing.  
An example may be instructive as to how seamlessly the Integrative 
Approach would operate with a recent case. The recent COVID-19 
pandemic has produced an explosion of insurance coverage litigation, 
particularly in the realm of business interruption coverage for pandemic-
related losses.156 Many businesses in America suffered significant 
financial losses because of government lockdowns aimed at curbing the 
spread of the COVID-19 virus. A high proportion of those businesses 
were insured by standard all-risks commercial property policies, many of 
which had additional coverage for business interruption losses. The 
business interruption coverage insured the business’ income stream in the 
event the business suffered a covered loss under the property policy. The 
coverage clause in the standard all-risks commercial property policy 
provides coverage for “direct physical loss of or damage to property.”157 
So, to claim for business interruption losses, a business would have to 
prove it suffered a covered “direct physical loss of or damage to 
property.” 
Imagine a nail salon was deemed a non-essential business and forced 
to close for three weeks due to a government-ordered shutdown during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Did the nail salon suffer a “direct physical loss 
of or damage to property” such that it could claim business interruption 
losses from its insurance policy? The coverage clause is not defined in the 
policy, nor are any of the individual terms in the clause.  
The Integrative Approach would prompt a broad construction of the 
clause with an eye to the policy’s risk management objectives. Here, all-
risks commercial property insurance is sold to protect the property 
interests of commercial policyholders. If something happens to their 
property, policyholders expect to be able to turn to their property 
insurance. The business interruption portion of that insurance would 
 
 156.  See, e.g., Knutsen & Stempel, Infected Judgment, supra note 3. 
 157.  See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, ON INSURANCE COVERAGE, supra note 41, § 15.01[D]. 
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insure the income stream connected with that property. If something 
happens to the property such that that loss is covered, the interrupted 
income stream resulting from that loss should be replaced by the 
insurance. 
By reading the policy, and keeping that context in mind, one would 
then turn to what “direct physical loss of or damage to property” means 
in the context of business interruption insurance as contained in all-risks 
commercial property insurance. Because the clause is a coverage clause, 
it should be construed broadly. While the property likely did not suffer 
“damage” as is ordinarily understood, did the policyholder suffer a “direct 
physical loss” because of the COVID-19-related order shutting down the 
business? “Loss” is mentioned separately from “damage.” The 
policyholder effectively had a “physical loss” during closure—it could 
not open, no one could work, and no customers could come to the store. 
It lost the use of the store. The clause does not appear to require any 
physical alteration to property, as the clause does not say so, and reading 
that limitation in would run contrary to reading a coverage clause broadly.  
If one turned to caselaw examining this coverage clause, there are 
many instances of courts granting coverage for loss of use of property 
when the premises in question is contaminated by some ephemeral things 
like smoke,158 mold,159 carbon monoxide,160 radiation,161 or gas.162 One 
could certainly make an analogy that a dangerous virus operates like those 
contaminants. However, some cases hold that the clause requires there to 
be actual physical alteration of the property for coverage to attach.163 As 
noted above, the clause does not demand that as a requirement for 
coverage.  
If courts are construing this clause in different ways, requiring different 
expectations for coverage to attach, and not agreeing that loss of use 
equates to a covered “loss,” then this is strong evidence that the clause is 
ambiguous. It is subject to two or more reasonable meanings, although 
we may quibble that the reading which reads in a requirement for tangible 
physical alteration may be on the fringes of reasonable. In that case, if a 
term is ambiguous, it is to be construed contra proferentem, as against the 
 
 158.  Oregon Shakespeare Festival Ass’n v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3267247 (D. Or. June 7, 
2016). 
 159.  Sullivan v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 956 A.2d 643 (Del. 2008); Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. 
v. Lillard-Roberts, No. CV-01-1362-ST, 2002 WL 31495830, at *8-*9 (D. Or. June 18, 2002) (applying 
Oregon law). 
 160.  Matzner v. Seaco Ins. Co., 1998 WL 566658 (Mass. Super. Aug. 12, 1998). 
 161.  Am. All. Ins. Co. v. Keleket X-Ray Corp., 248 F.2d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 1957). 
 162.  TRAVCO Ins. Co. v. Ward, 715 F.Supp.216 699 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 163.  See, e.g., Source Food Technology, Inc. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 465 F.3d 
834 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying Minnesota law); Mama Jo’s, Inc. v. Sparta Ins. Co., 823 F. App’x 868, 870 
(11th Cir.) (applying Florida law). 
60
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/5
2021] REJECTING WORD WORSHIP 621 
drafter. Therefore, insurance coverage would attach in this scenario. 
The Integrative Approach leads to this coverage result without the use 
of dictionaries. But, if one takes a purely textualist approach alone, one 
must struggle with the words “direct,” “physical,” “loss,” and “damage,” 
without reference to what each means and for what purpose. The result is 
likely a reductionist conclusion that “physical” means “something you 
can touch,” “loss” means “to lose something,” and “damage” means that 
“something came to harm.” That parse-out of the words approach still 
leaves one wondering what the phrase together means. To get to the 
phrase requiring actual tangible alteration to property for coverage to 
attach, one must emphasize the word “physical” above the other words. 
And one must ignore the legion of cases where invisible contamination 
resulted in insurance coverage being triggered for very similar kinds of 
losses. 
The accuracy of a purely textual approach may be improved through 
use of text-based inquiry that is not limited to dictionaries such as corpus 
linguistics, a process in which a large data base is scanned to examine the 
way words are used in a variety of writings.  Although this approach to 
discerning meaning holds promise and will often constitute an 
improvement over dictionary use alone, like any excessively textualist 
approach, it may be insufficient to resolve an interpretative dispute and 
even have potential to mislead. Corpus linguistics holds substantial 
promise for improving interpretation of insurance policies and other 
documents, but in our view should not be the sole or perhaps not even the 
primary determinant of documentary meaning.164 
The Integrative Approach arrives at a contextual, considered response 
to coverage that is closer to the commercial expectations of this all-risks 
commercial property policy, both from the perspective of the insurer and 
the policyholder. To the policyholder who cannot use its nail salon due to 
the government order banning occupancy, it has physically lost that 
 
 164.  See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Adding Context and Constraint to Corpus Linguistics, 86 BROOK. L. 
REV. 389 (2021).  For description, analysis, support and criticism of corpus linguistics, see Mouritsen, 
supra note 124 (criticizing isolated dictionary use and urging greater use of corpus linguistics for textual 
interpretation); Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Corpus and the Critics, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 
275 (2021) (arguing that although corpus linguistics focuses on textual meaning, the process inherently 
involves context as reflected in use of terms contained in wide range of writings and accepting that corpus 
linguistics analysis is not sole determinant of word meaning); Kevin Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning, 
134 HARV. L. REV. 726 (2020); Lawrence Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal 
Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1311 (2017) (summarizing and critiquing corpus linguistics). Several 
databases have been assembled containing millions or even billions of entries from newspaper, books, 
periodicals, broadcast transcripts and the like.  See e.g., Corpus of Historical American English, ENGLISH-
CORPORA, https://www.english-corpora.org/coha/ [https://perma.cc/2CAU-U9N5]; Corpus of 
Contemporary American English, ENGLISH-CORPORA, https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/ 
[https://perma.cc/99B2-4X4Z].  See generally Symposium, Data-Driven Interpretation, 86 BROOK. L. 
REV. (2021) (forthcoming); Symposium, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1297 (2017). 
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property. It cannot earn income. Coverage should be triggered. Its 
property interest in the property has effectively been harmed by a cause 
that is not excluded under the policy. To the insurer, it underwrote all-
risks property insurance that had a business interruption component to it. 
If something happened to result in interference with the policyholder’s 
property rights to such a degree that it could not operate its business, the 
policy should be triggered. 
CONCLUSION 
In contrast to rigid and restrictive textualism, a more Integrative 
Approach that sets a place at the table for an array of extrinsic and 
contextual evidence is likely to provide more accurate and just 
adjudication consistent with the intended meaning, purpose, and function 
of both statutes and contracts, particularly insurance policies. States 
construing insurance policies would get closer to justice by rejecting word 
worship and embracing the predecessor provision of the RLLI, the 
Restatement (Second) of Contract’s true interpretive spirit, the Thomas 
Drayage line of California cases, the reasonable expectations principle, 
and a contextual approach to determining the meaning of contracts, all of 
which are underpinnings to the Integrative Approach.   
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